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SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES UNDER THE 
CENTRAL AMERICA–DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC–UNITED STATES FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENT 
David A. Gantz* 
Abstract: The Central America–Dominican Republic–United States Free 
Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) is one of nearly a dozen post-North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreements (NAFTA) free trade agreements (FTAs) that 
the United States has concluded with nations in Latin America, the Middle 
East, and Asia since 2000. All of these newer agreements are based on 
NAFTA, but they differ in significant respects, particularly in the chapters 
relating to dispute settlement. Most significantly, the changes reflect U.S. 
government experience with NAFTA dispute settlement, particularly with 
regard to actions brought by private investors against the United States and 
other NAFTA governments under NAFTA’s investment protection provi-
sions (Chapter 11). However, the changes also result from perceived (as 
well as actual) threats to U.S. sovereignty, as reflected in the President’s 
Trade Promotion Authority of 2002. It is too soon to determine whether 
these changes will have a significant impact on dispute settlement under 
CAFTA-DR; some may well lead tribunals to conclusions different from 
those that would be rendered under NAFTA. Government-to-government 
dispute settlement proceedings under CAFTA-DR, as under NAFTA, are 
likely to be infrequent unless the roster is promptly appointed. 
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Introduction 
This is an historic day for the United States and our six partners in 
CAFTA-DR. This free trade agreement makes stronger the bond be-
tween us and our neighbors. CAFTA-DR creates an alliance for fair 
trade and will promote security and stability in our region. This is a 
win-win agreement that benefits American workers with greater ac-
cess to important markets, and our trading partners with new eco-
nomic opportunities . . . . America’s support for CAFTA-DR sends a 
strong signal to the world that the United States is committed to 
market liberalization. We look forward to continuing to work with 
Congress and our trading partners around the world to provide 
global opportunities for free and fair trade through the Doha Devel-
opment Agenda.1 
                                                                                                                      
1 Press Release, Ambassador Rob Portman, U.S. Trade Representative, Statement on 
Signing of U.S.-Central American-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (Aug. 2, 
2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2005/August/ 
Statement_of_USTR_Rob_Portman_on_Signing_of_US-Central_American-Dominican_Re- 
public_Free_Trade_Agreement_printer.html. 
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A. CAFTA-DR in Context 
 In recent years, many nations, including the United States and to a 
somewhat lesser extent the nations in Central America and the Carib-
bean, have participated in the proliferation of “regional trade agree-
ments” worldwide. The World Trade Organization (WTO) secretariat 
estimates that as of the end of 2005, based on notifications to the WTO, 
some 300 such agreements would be in force.2 
 The Central American-United States-Dominican Republic Free 
Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR)3 is one in what is now an extensive list 
of post-North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) free trade 
agreements (FTAs) concluded by the United States. Since 1999, the 
United States has concluded FTAs with Jordan,4 Singapore,5 Chile,6 
                                                                                                                      
2 See WTO, Regional Trade Agreements, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/re- 
gion_e/region_e.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2007). 
3 Central American-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement, Aug. 5, 
2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-DR_ 
Final_Texts/Section_Index.html (last visited May 5, 2007) [hereinafter CAFTA-DR]. The 
agreement is in force for the United States, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
and the Dominican Republic. The Agreement was expected to enter into force for Costa 
Rica before the end of 2007. The United States, pursuant to an amendment to Chapter 22, 
has been implementing the Agreement on a country-specific basis. The amendment pro-
vides in pertinent part that: 
this Agreement shall enter into force for any other signatory [after the first, 
El Salvador] on such date as the signatory and the United States shall specify 
in an exchange of diplomatic notes certifying that the signatory has com-
pleted its applicable legal procedures. Promptly after completing the ex-
change of diplomatic notes, the signatory shall notify the Depositary in writ-
ing of the date the Agreement shall enter into force for it. Unless the Parties 
otherwise agree, the Agreement shall not enter into force for it. Unless the 
Parties otherwise agree, the Agreement shall not enter into force for any sig-
natory after two years from the entry into force of the Agreement. 
Amendment to the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade 
Agreement, Mar. 10, 2006, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/ 
Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-DR_Final_Texts/asset_upload_file140_9291.pdf (last visited Feb. 
26, 2007). 
4 See Agreement Between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, Oct. 24, 2000, 41 I.L.M. 63 
[hereinafter Jordan FTA]. This was a “bare-bones” agreement by current standards, with 
less than 20 pages of text compared to hundreds with all of the other FTAS, and the only 
one concluded after NAFTA by the Clinton Administration. See id. 
5 See U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., May 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026, 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore_FTA/Final_Texts/ 
Section_Index.html (last visited May 5, 2007) [hereinafter Singapore FTA] (all U.S. FTAs are 
available at http://www.ustr.gov). 
6 See U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026 [here-
inafter Chile FTA]. 
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Morocco,7 Peru,8 Australia,9 Colombia,10 Oman,11 and Bahrain.12 All of 
these agreements, except those with Peru and Colombia, have received 
U.S. and foreign congressional approval, and are or will soon be in 
force. Negotiations continue at various levels of intensity with the re-
maining agreements.13 With the suspension of the WTO’s “Doha De-
velopment Round” of global trade negotiations,14 it seems reasonable 
to assume that the United States and other major trading nations will 
maintain or even step up their efforts to conclude more regional trade 
agreements,15 even though opposition in Congress and the likely expi-
ration of the President’s Trade Promotion Authority on June 30, 200716 
will likely make it difficult for the Bush Administration to undertake 
major new FTAs, except perhaps for the agreement under negotiation 
with South Korea. 
 The Central American nations have experience with regional 
trade agreements that pre-dates that of the United States. The initial 
instrument designed to create a common market in Central America 
                                                                                                                      
7 See U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Morocco, June 15, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 544 
[hereinafter Morocco FTA]. 
8 See U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S-Peru, Apr. 12, 2006, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Peru_TPA/Final_Texts/Section_Index.
html [hereinafter Peru FTA]. 
9 See U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., May 18, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 1248 
[hereinafter Australia FTA]. 
10 See Proposed United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Colom., 
Nov. 22, 2006, available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Colombia_ 
FTA/Draft_Text/Section_Index.html [hereinafter Colombia FTA]. 
11 See U.S.-Oman Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Oman, Jan. 18, 2006, available at http:// 
www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Oman_FTA/Final_Text/Section_Index.html [here- 
inafter Oman FTA]. 
12 See Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of 
the Kingdom of Bahrain on the Establishment of a Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Bahr., Sept. 
14, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Bahrain_FTA/final 
_texts/Section_Index.html. 
13 See generally Office of the United States Trade Representative Bilateral Agreements, 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Section_Index.html (last visited Feb. 
13, 2007) (listing various bilateral trade agreements including those currently being nego-
tiated between the United States and Malaysia, Panama, Republic of Korea, Thailand, and 
United Arab Emirates). 
14 Daniel Pruzin & Christopher S. Rugaber, WTO’s Doha Round Talks Collapse, as G-6 
Meeting Ends in Acrimony, 23 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1120 ( July 27, 2006). 
15 See Steven Chase, WTO Talks Collapse after 5 Years, GlobeandMail.com, July 24, 2005, 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/LAC.20060725.RWTO25/TPStory/?query 
=wto (commenting that “trade watchers” expect more bilateral free trade deals, with the 
“spaghetti bowl” effect of different agreements that hamper global commerce). 
16 Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3801–3814, 3803(b)(C)(ii) 
(2002). Renewal in 2007 is problematic. 
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was signed in 1960,17 even though its full implementation has been 
delayed by more than forty years of civil war and the lack of political 
will to deal with well-entrenched business and labor interest groups. 
The fact that most duties for trade within the five nation region (the 
Dominican Republic is not a party) have finally been eliminated, and 
that the common external tariff has been substantially implemented, 
can likely be traced in significant part to the anticipation of CAFTA-
DR, and the need to increase Central American industrial competi-
tiveness vis-à-vis Asia.18 
 There are also a number of bilateral FTAs between CAFTA-DR 
members and other nations. Among the outside nations that have ne-
gotiated FTAs with Central American nations are Mexico (Guatemala, 
El Salvador, Honduras); Chile (all); the Dominican Republic (all); Pa-
nama (all); Colombia (Guatemala); and Venezuela (Guatemala).19 The 
Dominican Republic’s only regional trade agreement, other than 
CAFTA-DR and the one with the Central American states, is a more lim-
ited, older (1973) agreement with Panama.20 Costa Rica has concluded 
an FTA with Canada, 21 and has concluded FTAs or similar agreements 
with the Caribbean group CARICOM, Panama, Mexico, Colombia, and 
Venezuela.22 The Central American nations (except Costa Rica) have 
been negotiating an FTA with Canada for at least four years, but to date 
no agreement has been reached.23 It was expected that negotiations of 
a long-discussed FTA between Central America and the European Un-
ion would be initiated before the end of 2006, although this does not 
                                                                                                                      
17 See General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration, Dec. 13, 1960, avail-
able at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/camertoc.asp (last visited Feb. 13, 2007). As usual, 
Costa Rica did not get around to signing until a couple of years later, on September 23, 
1963. See http://2005.sice.oas.org/tradee.asp#CACM (for date of signature and entry into 
force). 
18 Carol Osmond et al., Final Report, Implementation of Customs-Related 
Business Facilitations Measures as Part of the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(FTAA) Process, at Annex A (2004) (copy on file with author). 
19 SICE, Information on Guatemala, http://www.sice.oas.org/ctyindex/GTM/GTM- 
agreements_e.asp (last visited Apr. 30, 2007). 
20 SICE, Information on the Dominican Republic, http://www.sice.oas.org/ctyindex/ 
DOM/DOMagreements_e.asp (last visited Apr. 30, 2007). 
21 See Canada-Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement, Apr. 2001, http://www.dfait-maeci. 
gc.ca/tna-nac/Costa_Rica_toc-en.asp (last visited Feb. 13, 2007). 
22 SICE, Information on Costa Rica, http://www.sice.oas.org/ctyindex/CRI/CRI- 
agreements_e.asp (last visited Apr. 30, 2007). 
23 The negotiations were initiated in the fall of 2001, with the most recent negotiations 
held in February 2004. See Foreign Affairs and Int’l Trade Canada, Canada-Central America 
Four Free Trade Negotiations, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/ca4-en.asp (last visited 
Feb. 13, 2007). 
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seem to have occurred.24 However, many of the non-U.S. agreements 
do not have full coverage of areas such as investment and intellectual 
property.25 
 All of the NAFTA Parties have attempted FTAs with Central 
America, but only the United States has managed to conclude one 
with all five of the Central American nations. The United States has 
the most to offer with regard to market access for both agricultural 
and manufactured goods, even if, as one observer has rather critically 
put it, that “access involves idiosyncratic rules, self-defeating trade-
offs, uneven playing fields, and political benefits overshadowing eco-
nomic costs. The U.S. sets the standards . . . .”26 For Canada, it may be 
that concluding negotiations is more difficult where development 
preconditions, human rights, democratic governance, and the like are 
preconditions for negotiations,27 all of which only Costa Rica has met. 
For Mexico, it has been possible to conclude agreements with the 
northern Central American nations despite somewhat differing his-
torical relationships and earlier frictions.28 However, given the large 
number of Mexican FTAs with various countries both within and out-
side Latin America,29 it is not surprising that most of the Central 
American nations (except Nicaragua) are included. 
 The U.S. FTAs, including CAFTA-DR, while varying considerably 
in their content and coverage, share far more similarities than differ-
                                                                                                                      
24 See Joint Communiqué, Council of the EU, EU-Central American Summit, ¶ 2, May 
13, 2006, http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=PRES/06/139& 
format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited Feb. 13, 2007). 
25 As discussed infra, the United States has for decades sought bilateral agreements (ei-
ther as part of FTAs or free-standing) to protect U.S. investors abroad against adverse ac-
tions by host countries. Also, since well before NAFTA and after the entry into force of the 
WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) (see 
generally Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.doc (last visited May 5, 
2007)), protection of U.S. intellectual property—ranging from copyrights, patents and 
trademarks to chip masks and certain Internet content—has also been a hallmark of U.S. 
international economic policy. USTR, Special 301 Report (2006), Background and Ex-
ecutive Summary, http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/ 
2006/2006_Special_301_Review/asset_upload_file324_9334.pdf and http://www.ustr.gov/as- 
sets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2006/2006_Special_301_Review/asset_upl
oad_file180_9335.pdf (giving the background on Special 301 and reflecting the high im-
portance of IP since 1988). 
26 A. Imtiaz Hussain, Running on Empty in Central America? Canadian, Mexi-
can, and US Integrative Efforts 15 (2006). 
27 Id. at 57. 
28 Id. at 54–55. 
29 See SICE, Information on Mexico, http://www.sice.oas.org/ctyindex/MEX/MEXag- 
reements_e.asp (last visited Apr. 30, 2007) (citing more than one dozen Mexican FTAs). 
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ences. All are extensively patterned after NAFTA,30 in that they are 
comprehensive agreements that deal with tariff and non-tariff barrier 
elimination for trade in goods (including extensive, but not full cov-
erage, of agriculture), rules of origin, and include chapters on stan-
dards, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, government procure-
ment, intellectual property (with some rules going beyond the re-
quirements of the WTO’s Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual 
Property (TRIPS)),31 services, investment32, rudimentary competition 
law, labor rights, and the environment.33 As with all post-NAFTA U.S. 
FTAs, CAFTA-DR treats labor rights and environmental protection in 
the body of the Agreement rather than in separate “side” agreements. 
 CAFTA-DR consists of twenty-two chapters, most with self-
contained annexes; a “market access” annex (rules of interpretation); 
product specific rules of origin (143 pages); Annex I (specific excep-
tions on a country-specific basis); Annex II (additional non-conforming 
measures); Annex III (financial services non-conforming measures); 
tariff schedules for each of the seven Parties; and an extensive series of 
“side letters,” again on a country by country basis.34 This means, of 
course, that there are few CAFTA-DR legal questions that can be an-
swered safely by simply reviewing one or two provisions, or even one 
annex. With investment, in particular, not only Chapter 10, but also 
Annexes I and II, are likely critical to any analysis. 
 With a few exceptions—Australia, Singapore, and South Korea (if 
successfully negotiated)—all post-NAFTA U.S. FTAs are with develop-
ing (or near-developing) countries, particularly small developing coun-
                                                                                                                      
30 See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.--Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 
I.L.M. 289 (1993), available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.aspx? 
CategoryID=42 [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
31 Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1(C), 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 33 I.L.M. 1125 
(1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.doc. 
32 The Australia FTA lacks mandatory investor-state arbitration, although standards for 
treatment of foreign investors are included. See generally Australia FTA, supra note 9. There 
are no investment provisions in the Jordan FTA, but the U.S. and Jordan concluded a bi-
lateral investment treaty in 1997 that entered into force in 2003. U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. 
Bilateral Investment Treaty Program, Dec. 5, 2006, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/fs/ 
22422.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2007) [hereinafter USBIT Program]. 
33 All of the post-NAFTA agreements contain some form of labor and environmental 
provisions in the body of the agreement, rather than in the two NAFTA “side agreements.” 
See generally North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), U.S.-
Can.-Mex., Sept. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1482 [hereinafter NAAEC]; North American Agree-
ment on Labor Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Sept. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1502 [hereinafter 
NAALC]. 
34 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, passim. 
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tries such as those in Central America and the northern half of South 
America. Since trade with none of these FTA partners—with the possi-
ble exception of Singapore and South Korea—is in itself significant for 
the United States (particularly compared to NAFTA),35 one needs to be 
aware of other important U.S. interests that may be advanced by the 
accords. These include security issues with regard to Jordan, Oman, 
Morocco, Bahrain, and Singapore, and the advancement of economic 
development/democratic institutions/rule of law with CAFTA-DR, Peru, 
Colombia, and Ecuador (discussed in more detail below). 
B. The Importance of Dispute Settlement Provisions in FTAs 
 While there are many areas of these agreements that could benefit 
from close analysis by those who will be directly affected by them— in-
cluding but not limited to rules of origin, transparency, trade facilita-
tion, environmental protection, and labor protection—this Article fo-
cuses on the area of dispute settlement, specifically those involving for-
eign investment and those relating to disagreements among the State 
Parties over the application and interpretation of the FTAs. NAFTA’s 
investment dispute Chapter 11 has been one of the most widely used— 
and controversial—of all NAFTA mechanisms, with the Chapter 20 gov-
ernment-to-government mechanism less used. Taken together, the three 
major areas of NAFTA dispute settlement, Chapter 11 (investment), 
Chapter 19 (review of antidumping and countervailing duty administra-
tive actions), and Chapter 20 (general dispute settlement), have in-
volved literally hundreds of proceedings over a thirteen year period.36 
                                                                                                                      
35 Two-way trade with South Korea in 2005 was approximately $72 billion, while that 
among the NAFTA partners was in excess of $772 billion in 2005, with Australia, $30.1 
billion, with Malaysia, about $38 billion, (both 2004) and that between the CAFTA-DR 
nations and the United States (2003) was about $32 billion. Ministro de Economia, http:// 
www.economia.gob.mx/index.jsp?P=2113&NLang=en (last visited Feb. 13, 2007); Press 
Release, U.S. Trade Rep., United States, South Korea Announce Intention to Negotiate 
Free Trade Agreement (Feb. 2, 2006), http://www.ustr.gov (last visited Feb. 13, 2007); 
Press Release, U.S. Trade Rep. Zoellick, Statement at Signing of U.S.-D.R.-Central America 
FTA (Aug. 5, 2004), http://www.ustr.gov (last visited Feb. 13, 2007). Other two-way trade 
data (Australia, Malaysia) can also be found in the State Department’s “background notes.” 
U.S. Dep’t of State, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2007). 
36 See David A. Gantz, The United States and NAFTA Dispute Settlement: Ambivalence, Frus-
tration and Occasional Defiance (University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law, Dis-
cussion Paper No. 06–26), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=918542 [hereinafter NAFTA Dispute Settlement]. 
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(The separate NAFTA side agreements on labor and environment have 
also generated numerous citizen complaints, but no arbitrations.37) 
 The task of analyzing CAFTA-DR dispute settlement is considera-
bly easier than with NAFTA, since there are only two major mecha-
nisms, for investment and for government-to-government disputes. 
Labor and environmental obligations have been merged into the text 
of the Agreement; they are no longer separate, and are thus discussed 
in the context of government-to-government dispute settlement. In 
addition, the NAFTA Chapter 19 mechanism for review of unfair 
trade actions has not been replicated in CAFTA-DR, or in any other 
U.S. FTA.38 
 Investment is a key element of U.S. FTAs, beginning with the 
U.S.-Canada FTA in 1988. Nor, apparently, is the U.S. alone. Accord-
ing to a recent U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNC-
TAD) study, “[i]nternational investment rules are increasingly being 
adopted as part of agreements that address inter alia trade and in-
vestment.”39 The region is not a major destination for U.S. direct for-
eign investment; as of 2005, aggregate foreign direct investment (FDI) 
for the six CAFTA-DR countries was only about four billion dollars, 
roughly five percent of U.S. FDI in Mexico, and flows were erratic.40 
While there appears to be little empirical data demonstrating that in-
vestment protection agreements directly stimulate FDI, it seems intui-
tive to believe that a more favorable investment climate could be an 
important factor in encouraging foreign investment in small markets 
with few natural resources. Investment agreements, along with politi-
cal stability, a well-functioning legal system, educated workers, reason-
able labor and tax laws, and good infrastructure, are relevant to in-
                                                                                                                      
37 Sixty submissions have been made under the NAFTA Environmental side agreement 
through mid-July 2006. See Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Citizen Submis-
sions on Enforcement Matters, http://cec.org/citizen/status/index.cfm?varlan=english 
(last visited Feb. 26, 2007). Twenty-eight public submissions had been filed under the 
NAALC (through March 2004). See Commission for Labor Cooperation, Summary of Pub-
lic Communications, http://www.naalc.org/english/pdf/pcommtable_en.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 13, 2007). 
38 The reasons for this are somewhat complex. See NAFTA Dispute Settlement, supra note 
36, at 14–23. 
39 See U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., Highlights of Investment Provisions in 
Economic Integration Agreements, http://www.unctad.org/templates/webflyer.asp?docid 
=6935&intItemID=2310&lang=1 (last visited Feb. 13, 2007). 
40 See U.S. Dept. of Commerce Bureau of Econ. Analysis, Int’l Econ. Accounts, http:// 
www.bea.gov/bea/di/usdctry/longctry.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2007). FDI for the six 
CAFTA-DR countries was $3.989 billion, compared to $71.423 billion for Mexico. Id. 
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vestment decisions.41 In any event, U.S. FTAs almost invariably include 
investment protection provisions,42 and well prior to the CAFTA-DR, 
three of the six developing State Parties had negotiated bilateral in-
vestment treaties with the United States.43 
 Additionally, with seven Parties instead of three, six of which are 
at a significantly lower stage of economic development and experi-
ence with international economic agreements than any of the NAFTA 
parties, disputes regarding the application and interpretation of the 
Agreement are almost inevitable. While the Parties are all members of 
the WTO, and thus have available the WTO’s Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSB),44 the various provisions of CAFTA-DR that are not cov-
ered by the WTO agreements, including but not limited to provisions 
on labor and environment, and some of those in the intellectual 
property area, make at least some Chapter 20 disputes likely. 
 This Article is intended both to explain the dispute settlement 
provisions, and to highlight the differences in CAFTA-DR as com-
pared to NAFTA. It is not, however, a comprehensive analysis of the 
NAFTA jurisprudence, particularly the many tribunal decisions under 
the NAFTA Chapter 11 investment provisions.45 In the analysis, I have 
tried to steer a middle ground between readers with sophisticated ex-
pertise in investment agreements and investor-state arbitration, and 
those who are newer to the area, realizing that some of the commen-
tary will be overly simplistic for some, and perhaps too complex for 
others, for which I apologize in advance. 
                                                                                                                      
41 A recent study concludes that bilateral investment treaties (and, presumably, similar 
provisions of FTAs) “do indeed have a positive impact on FDI flows to developing coun-
tries,” as a signal of welcome to foreign investors, but that conclusion of a BIT alone does 
not permit developing countries to “avoid the hard work of improving their own domestic 
environment as it affects the political risks of investment.” Jennifer Tobin & Susan Rose-
Ackerman, When BITs Have Some Bite: The Political-Economic Environment for Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaties, Nov. 14, 2006, at 31, available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/ 
When_BITs_Have_Some_Bite.doc. 
42 The Australia FTA lacks mandatory investor-state arbitration. See generally Australia 
FTA, supra note 9. There are no investment provisions in the Jordan FTA, but the U.S. and 
Jordan concluded a bilateral investment treaty in 1997 that entered into force in 2003. See 
USBIT Program, supra note 32. 
43 El Salvador (1999), Honduras (1995), and Nicaragua (1995). Only the Honduras 
agreement actually entered into force. USBIT Program, supra note 32. 
44 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 
33 I.L.M. 13 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]. 
45 See generally NAFTA Investment Law and Arbitration: Past Issues, Current 
Practice, Future Prospects (Todd Weiler ed., 2004) (discussing various aspects of 
Chapter 11 dispute settlement, including the case law). 
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 Part II constitutes a brief summary of CAFTA-DR and its objec-
tives, primarily but not exclusively from the point of view of the 
United States. It attempts to answer, at least in part, perhaps the most 
obvious question—why did the U.S. government devote an enormous 
volume of negotiating resources, and considerable political capital, to 
secure the conclusion and congressional approval of an FTA that, 
when fully in force, will produce only about as much annual trade as 
NAFTA does in three weeks? 
 Part III focuses on CAFTA-DR Chapter 10, Section A, the protec-
tions for foreign investors afforded under the Agreement. Part IV dis-
cusses the actual process of investor-state international arbitration, as 
structured in Section B of Chapter 10. Both draw on other sections of 
CAFTA-DR, including the Chapter 11 definitions and annexes, and 
general annexes I and II. All of these provisions are patterned closely, 
but by no means slavishly on NAFTA’s Chapter 11, with changes reflect-
ing the NAFTA experience.46 More recent FTAs, such as those with Co-
lombia and Peru, contain further innovations, including the treatment 
of foreign debt restructuring under the investment chapter.47 
 Part V discusses the government-to-government dispute settle-
ment mechanism created under CAFTA-DR Chapter 20, with particu-
lar attention to a series of procedural additions. It also addresses a 
potential increase in jurisdiction resulting from the inclusion of labor 
and environment provisions in the body of CAFTA-DR, rather than in 
side agreements as under NAFTA. Part VI attempts to draw some con-
clusions as to how the dispute settlement mechanisms will function 
under CAFTA-DR. 
 At the risk of stating the obvious, since CAFTA-DR is not yet fully 
in force,48 any commentary about the likely usage rate of its dispute 
settlement provisions is largely speculative, although some predictions 
are based on the NAFTA experience. My best guess is that the overall 
numbers will be lower, since CAFTA-DR does not incorporate a mecha-
                                                                                                                      
46 The author has undertaken a somewhat similar analysis with regard to the Chile 
FTA. See generally David A. Gantz, The Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions: From NAFTA to 
the United States–Chile Free Trade Agreement, 19 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 680 (2004) [hereinafter 
Gantz, Evolution]. 
47 See, e.g., U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Peru, Annex 10-F, Apr. 12, 2006, 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Peru_TPA/Final_Texts/asset_upload 
_file483_9547.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2007) (providing that no award may be made for de-
fault or non-payment of public debt unless there is a tribunal finding of expropriation or 
breach of another Section A obligation; commercial risks involved in the purchase of public 
debt are excluded). 
48 See supra note 3. 
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nism for review of administrative determinations in unfair trade, ac-
tions along the lines of NAFTA’s Chapter 19.49 These usage rates may, 
however, be affected by the manner in which the Free Trade Commis-
sion under the Agreement goes about implementing various proce-
dural steps, such as appointing the roster of potential arbitrators for 
government-to-government disputes.50 The Commission will not likely 
address those questions until the Agreement has gone into force for all 
of the Parties.51 In the end, as with NAFTA, the viability of the dispute 
settlement mechanisms, particularly Chapter 20, will depend on 
whether the governments implement them in good faith. 
I. The Broader Significance of CAFTA-DR 
 CAFTA-DR is concerned first with increasing trade among the 
Parties, particularly the volume of two-way trade between the United 
States and each of the other State Parties. However, the Agreement is 
probably as much a vehicle for economic development as it is for 
trade expansion per se, more so than NAFTA or any other earlier FTA, 
in areas such as rule of law, “trade capacity building,” customs proce-
dures, regulatory transparency, private property rights, competition, 
“civil society” participation, environmental protection, and labor law. 
Forty-five years after the General Treaty on Central American Eco-
nomic Integration was concluded in 1960, CAFTA-DR, along with 
promised negotiations of an FTA with the European Union, might 
provide the necessary impetus for the Central American nations to 
complete the customs union and harmonization of commercial law 
that was agreed to so long ago.52 
 The U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR) statement at the signing 
of the CAFTA-DR, quoted at the beginning of this article, sums up the 
multiple U.S. motives for the FTA. Those considerations included 
strengthening economic and other ties with six small nations, none of 
them major U.S. trading partners, but most—Guatemala, El Salvador, 
the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua—nations in which the United 
States has politically intervened in the past, sometimes with disastrous 
                                                                                                                      
49 Neither CAFTA-DR, nor any of the other post-NAFTA U.S. FTAs, nor any post-
NAFTA FTAs concluded by Canada or Mexico, replicate the NAFTA Chapter 19 provisions. 
See NAFTA, supra note 30, ch. 19. See generally CAFTA-DR, supra note 3. 
50 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 20, art. 20.7. 
51 Telephone Interview with USTR Lawyer (Aug. 17, 2006). 
52 See David A. Gantz, The Free Trade Area of the Americas: An Idea Whose Time Has Come 
and Gone?, 1 Loy. U. Chi. Int’l L. Rev. 179, 194–195 (2004) [hereinafter Gantz, FTAA]. 
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results.53 Security and stability in the region, perhaps with a greater 
concern for democracy than in the past, remains a U.S. objective in 
the post 9/11 world, as does illegal immigration from the region. As 
another USTR document noted: “In the 1980s, Central America was 
characterized by civil war, chaos, dictators, and Communist insurgen-
cies. Today, Central America is a region of fragile democracies that 
need U.S. support . . . . CAFTA-DR is a way for America to support 
freedom, democracy and economic reform in our own neighbor-
hood.”54 
 Second, probably more for U.S. domestic audiences, “fair” trade 
is designed, through the use of market forces and the creation of 
“economic opportunities,” to stimulate economic development, job 
growth, and exports. This is more than lip service, given the extensive 
CAFTA-DR provisions on trade facilitation55 and trade capacity build-
ing,56 but it does not extend to market opening in sugar; USTR 
boasted that increased sugar imports from the region—a major pro-
ducer—amounted to only a bit more than one day’s U.S. produc-
tion.57 Even though trade volumes are small compared to NAFTA, in 
2004, the roughly fifteen billion dollars in exports to the six CAFTA-
DR nations made the group the fourteenth largest U.S. export market 
worldwide, and second after Mexico in Latin America.58 For the Cen-
tral American nations, the United States is the most important mar-
ket, representing from about thirty-five percent to over eighty percent 
of total trade,59 and for some sectors, such as apparel, U.S. market 
access is significantly expanded.60 Trade with the United States is thus 
far more important to those countries than to the United States. 
                                                                                                                      
53 See Stephen Kinzer, Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime Change from 
Hawaii to Iraq 56–77 [Nicaragua], 129–147 [Guatemala] (2006); U.S. Library of Con-
gress, Civil War and United States Intervention, 1965, available at http://countrystudies. 
us/dominican-republic/13.htm (last visited May 5, 2007). 
54 USTR, The Case for CAFTA 1 (2005), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agree- 
ments/Bilateral/CAFTA/Briefing_Book/asset_upload_file235_7178.pdf [hereinafter CAFTA 
Facts]. 
55 See CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 5. 
56 See id. ch. 19(B). 
57 CAFTA Facts, supra note 54, at 2. 
58 U.S. Trade Rep., CAFTA Facts: Small Countries, BIG Markets 1 (2005), http:// 
www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/Briefing_Book/asset_upload_file 
118 _7180.pdf. 
59 See U.S. Dep’t of State, Background Notes, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/ (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2007) (specifically: Costa Rica, at 2; Dominican Republic, at 2; El Salvador, 
at 1; Guatemala, at 2; Honduras, at 2; and Nicaragua, at 2). 
60 Despite the sensitivity of textiles and apparel, some significant additional market 
opportunities were afforded in that sector, but with duty-free, quota-free entry permitted 
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 Third, CAFTA-DR (and other FTAs like it) were intended to be a 
demonstration of the U.S. commitment to freer trade (and perhaps a 
not so veiled threat) at the global as well as the regional level, includ-
ing the likelihood that if not everyone will seek these goals, the 
United States will negotiate with those who will.61 
 Unmentioned in Ambassador Portman’s statement, but high-
lighted elsewhere,62 was the fact that CAFTA-DR contains language de-
signed to protect, to at least some degree internationally, recognized 
labor rights and the environment.63 These controversial (and to some, 
overly weak) provisions, which almost led to the defeat of CAFTA-DR in 
Congress because of Democratic opposition,64 are largely beyond the 
scope of a discussion of CAFTA-DR dispute settlement, except to a lim-
ited degree in Part V. The post-NAFTA U.S. FTAs make the labor and 
environmental provisions—whether or not considered otherwise suffi-
cient—subject to the general dispute settlement mechanism (Chapter 
20 in CAFTA-DR), rather than to separate agreements as is the case 
with NAFTA. 
II. Investment Protection Under CAFTA-DR Chapter 10 
 Despite the differences among U.S. FTAs, an understanding of 
NAFTA is essential to an understanding of the newer FTAs. With such 
understanding, a person with reasonable expertise in NAFTA can attain 
similar expertise in dealing with the provisions of CAFTA-DR and other 
similar agreements relatively quickly. This seems particularly true with 
regard to protection of investment provisions. As with NAFTA, CAFTA-
                                                                                                                      
in most instances only if U.S. or regional fabric and yarns were used. This was rightfully 
justified on a global competitiveness basis: “[W]ith the expiration of global quotas on tex-
tiles/apparel at the end of 2004, regional producers face a new competitive challenge 
from Asian imports. CAFTA would provide regional garment-makers—and their U.S. or 
regional suppliers of fabric and yarn—a critical advantage in competing with Asia.” CAFTA 
Facts, supra note 54, at 1. 
61 The signing of CAFTA-DR came at a time when it was becoming more and more ob-
vious that the United States’ initiative for a “Free Trade Area of the Americas” was foun-
dering and would likely be abandoned. See, e.g., Gantz, FTAA, supra note 52, at 183–192 
(exploring the reasons why the FTAA seemed doomed to failure). 
62 USTR termed these as “Strong Protections for Labor and the Environment,” noting 
that the agreement provisions were designed to focus on assisting the CAFTA-DR nations 
in enforcing core ILO principles. CAFTA Facts, supra note 54. 
63 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, chs. 16, 17. CAFTA Facts, supra note 54, at 2. 
64 See Press Release, Nancy Pelosi, U.S. House of Representatives, Democratic Leader, 
Pelosi Statement in Opposition to CAFTA (May 28, 2004), http://www.house.gov/pelosi/ 
press//releases/May04/CAFTA052804.html (statement of then House Democratic leader 
explaining opposition to CAFTA-DR, largely on grounds of insufficient protection of labor 
rights and the environment). 
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DR’s investment chapter is divided into three major sections, invest-
ment, investor-state dispute settlement, and definitions. In addition, as 
with NAFTA, CAFTA-DR contains a series of annexes reserving the 
right to temporarily or permanently reject or limit foreign investment 
in certain sectors. However, unlike NAFTA, CAFTA-DR also contains a 
series of investment specific reservations, clarifications, and procedural 
requirements, many of which are discussed in this section or in Part IV. 
A. The NAFTA Background and Influence 
 NAFTA’s investment provisions were anything but radical when 
incorporated into the agreement. The obligations to investors lan-
guage (Section A) was taken in significant part from the U.S.-Canada 
Free Trade Agreement,65 and both the obligations to investors and 
the dispute settlement provisions (Section B) reflected what at the 
time was more than a decade of U.S. experience concluding bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) with various developing nations.66 By the 
time CAFTA-DR was negotiated, the negotiators (presumably for all 
parties) were aware of extensive investor-state litigation under NAFTA, 
some of which was relevant and some of which was not to the situation 
of the six CAFTA-DR parties. That history—and Congressional per-
ception of it—caused a significant reshaping of the CAFTA-DR in-
vestment provisions as compared to NAFTA’s investment provisions. 
 As far as I have been able to determine, none of the NAFTA ne-
gotiators thought much about NAFTA’s major departure from the 
BITs negotiated earlier; all of the earlier agreements with mandatory 
investor-state arbitration were with developing, capital importing na-
tions, rather than with developed, capital exporting (as well as import-
ing) nations, such as Canada. The conventional wisdom seems to have 
been an assumption that the Chapter 11 provisions would be used 
almost exclusively by United States and Canadian investors in Mexico, 
and hardly ever by Mexican investors against Canada and the United 
                                                                                                                      
65 United States–Canada Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can., ch. 16, Jan. 2, 1988, 27 
I.L.M. 281 [hereinafter “CFTA”]. 
66 See Daniel M. Price & P. Bryan Christy, III, Overview of the NAFTA Investment Chapter: 
Substantive Rules and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, in The North American Free Trade 
Agreement: A New Frontier in International Trade and Investment in the Ameri-
cas 165, 167 ( Judith H. Bello et al. eds., 1993) (discussing the negotiation and conclusion 
of the investment chapter by the principal negotiator, Dan Price). See generally K. Scott 
Gudgeon, United States Bilateral Investment Treaties: Comments on their Origin Purposes and 
General Treatment Standards, 4 Int’l Tax & Bus. Law 105 (1986) (discussion of the origin 
and early experience of the U.S. bilateral investment treaty program by one of the State 
Department negotiators). 
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States, simply because both the United States and Canada maintained 
highly developed legal systems with independent, non-corrupt, and 
well-educated judiciaries. Why, under those circumstances, would 
anyone prefer international arbitration to domestic courts? 
 In retrospect, this view may seem naïve, but at the time it seemed 
logical enough, and the likelihood of multiple disputes between United 
States investors and Canada, or vice versa, did not appear to be a matter 
for concern.67 Even if the concerns had been raised, they probably 
would not have significantly changed the agreement. Protection for 
foreign investors was a key objective of NAFTA (since job creation in 
Mexico was thought to depend on it), and there was no precedent for 
including such provisions in an FTA or BIT unless they were equally 
applicable to all parties. 
 The volume of U.S.-Canada investment is sufficiently enormous— 
$175 billion from the United States to Canada and $134 billion from 
Canada to the United States68—to assure that there are at least a few 
actual or potential disputes with each host government. Additionally, 
there is a sufficient cadre of well-trained, aggressive, and creative attor-
neys in each country, even given the well-respected national court sys-
tems, so that testing of the limits of investment treaty protections might 
have been anticipated. Finally, there is probably no government on 
earth in which regulatory actions couched in terms of protecting the 
environment or worker rights or other worthwhile purposes are not in 
fact occasionally taken for protectionist purposes, or are simply arbi-
trary, discriminatory, or unreasonable. In any event, in actual experi-
ence, of the roughly forty-two matters notified to the NAFTA Parties 
under Chapter 11, almost two thirds have been by U.S. investors against 
Canada, or Canadian investors against the United States.69 
                                                                                                                      
67 Gantz, Evolution, supra note 46, at 693–95 (discussing these issues at greater length). 
68 U.S. Dept. of State, Background Note: Canada, July 2006, at 5, available at http:// 
www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2089.htm (last visited May 5, 2007). 
69 This is based on the best information available regarding the number of “notices of 
intent to submit a claim to arbitration” under NAFTA, Article 1119. NAFTA, supra note 30, 
art. 1119. It can be reasonably argued that this is an imperfect measure, since not all such 
notices of intent resulted in actual claim submissions under NAFTA, Article 1120, and even 
fewer were pursued through arbitration. See id. art. 1120. On the other hand, it is at least 
possible that other notices of intent were filed which have never become public. Regard-
less of what criterion is used, there have been a significant number of proceedings in 
which American investors brought claims against Canada, and vice versa. In the author’s 
view, the best source of information on NAFTA claims—and by far the easiest to navigate—
is a proprietary but free website managed by attorney Todd Weiler, http://www.nafta- 
claims.com, which has fewer gaps than the three government websites. See NAFTA Claims, 
http://www.naftaclaims.com (last visited Feb. 13, 2007). 
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 NAFTA’s experience has thus been a particularly educational, if 
occasionally painful, one for the NAFTA governments, including the 
United States, whose government lawyers are no more fond of losing 
court or arbitral decisions than other attorneys, and whose Members 
of Congress or Parliament do not particularly want to spend taxpayer 
money on foreign investor claims. This concern persists despite the 
fact that the United States has never lost a NAFTA tribunal decision 
that found it in violation of NAFTA or required it to compensate a 
foreign investor. To the extent possible, the perceived errors in open-
ing too wide the doors in NAFTA Chapter 11 would not be made in 
subsequent FTA investment chapters or BITs. 
 Some of the specific government and congressional concerns are 
discussed below, in the analysis of certain CAFTA-DR Chapter 10 pro-
visions. The most notable relate to: (1) the types of conflicts between 
legitimate government regulatory actions (particularly those designed 
to protect the environment) and “takings” that would be compensable 
under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution;70 (2) NAFTA 
tribunal review of decisions of national courts; and (3) the possibility 
that foreign citizens bringing NAFTA investment claims may end up 
with greater rights than what U.S. citizens facing the same govern-
mental action would have under what may be their only available 
remedy, the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
 In particular, criticism has focused on two actions against the 
United States, Methanex v. United States71 and Loewen Group v. United 
States.72 The first involved an alleged “regulatory” taking, based on a 
California decision to ban a gasoline additive, MTBE, allegedly on 
health grounds, to the detriment of Methanex’ methanol production 
operations. The original tribunal dismissed the claim because Methanex 
lacked a sufficient nexus under the “relating to” language under 
NAFTA, Art. 1101, since Methanex did not produce MTBE, but only its 
                                                                                                                      
70 See generally, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 
535 U.S. 302 (2002) (holding, inter alia, that a temporary moratorium on building in the 
Lake Tahoe Basin did not constitute a compensable taking). The relevant clause in the 
Fifth Amendment states only that “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V. 
71 Methanex v. United States (Methanex I), Preliminary Award on Jurisdiction, 42 
I.L.M. 514 (2002), available at http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/Meth- 
anexPreliminaryAwardJurisdiction.pdf; Methanex v. United States (Methanex II), Final 
Award on Jurisdiction and Merits, 2005, available at http://www.naftaclaims.com (follow 
“Disputes” hyperlink; then follow “USA” hyperlink; then follow “Methanex” hyperlink). 
72 See generally Loewen Group Inc. v. United States (Award), 42 I.L.M. 811 (2003); 
Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States (Decision on Request for Consideration), 44 I.L.M 
836 (2005). 
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prime ingredient, methanol.73 Ultimately, all claims against the United 
States were dismissed either on jurisdictional grounds or on the mer-
its,74 but not before the lengthy proceedings raised serious concerns 
among non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and some Members of 
Congress over the prospect of such environmental action costing the 
United States or California hundreds of millions of dollars, and result-
ing in a chilling effect on necessary government regulation in the fu-
ture. 
 Loewen raised the specter of NAFTA review, ultimately on denial 
of justice grounds, of a decision of a Mississippi state court. That case 
was ultimately dismissed on procedural grounds and for failure of one 
of the claimants to exhaust his local remedies as required under in-
ternational law, but only after the tribunal characterized the Missis-
sippi proceedings as a “disgrace.”75 In fact, it established a very high 
standard—denial of justice under international law—for effective sec-
ond-guessing of a national court decision. 
 These cases led to various public objections, and ultimately to 
negotiating objectives and guidelines (not mandatory, but to be ig-
nored only at the President’s peril) for future investment provisions in 
international trade agreements and BITs. These guidelines were em-
bodied in the 2002 U.S. Trade Promotion Authority, which allows the 
President to negotiate future trade agreements and BITs: 
[T]he principal negotiating objectives of the United States re-
garding foreign investment are to reduce or eliminate artificial 
or trade-distorting barriers to foreign investment, while ensuring 
that foreign investors in the United States are not accorded greater sub-
stantive rights with respect to investment protections than United States 
investors in the United States, and to secure for investors impor-
tant rights comparable to those that would be available under 
United States legal principles and practice, by— 
 (A) reducing or eliminating exceptions to the principle of 
national treatment: 
 . . . . 
 (D) seeking to establish standards for expropriation and compen-
sation for expropriation, consistent with United States legal princi-
ples and practice; 
                                                                                                                      
73 See Methanex I, 42 I.L.M. 514, ¶ 172(2). 
74 See Methanex II, Final Award on Jurisdiction and Merits, at 300, http://naftaclaims. 
com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/Methanex_Final_Award.pdf. 
75 See Loewen, 42 I.L.M. at 830, 833, 846, 850. See generally Loewen, 44 I.L.M 836. 
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 (E) seeking to establish standards for fair and equitable treatment 
consistent with United States legal principles and practice, including 
the principle of due process . . . .76 
Thus, as one U.S. government attorney put it: 
Each of the United States’ post-NAFTA agreements embodies 
changes that reflect the negotiating objectives . . . . Many of 
these objectives, as well as the resulting changes made to the 
agreements, have their origin in the United States’ experience 
with NAFTA Chapter Eleven arbitration. In broad terms, the 
significant changes include the clarification of standards of 
certain substantive provisions, as well as modifications made 
to promote the transparency of investor-State arbitration, im-
prove the efficiency of arbitrations, deter the filing of frivo-
lous claims, and ensure the consistency of interpretations of 
similar obligations across agreements.77 
It was in this context, therefore, that the U.S. negotiators proceeded 
with the negotiations of the Singapore and Chile FTAs (the first two 
to use modified investment language), and with CAFTA-DR. 
B. CAFTA-DR’s Investor Protections 
 At the outset, several important distinctions between NAFTA and 
CAFTA-DR that affect investment should be noted, even at the risk of 
stating the obvious. First, except for the United States, the other 
CAFTA-DR parties are developing nations, with relatively little invest-
ment in the United States, as is the case with most U.S. bilateral in-
vestment treaties, despite their being reciprocal in their included 
rights and obligations. Thus, there is likely to be relatively little inves-
tor-related litigation directed at the United States. Secondly, six of the 
seven parties to the CAFTA-DR are also parties to the Convention on 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals 
of Other States (ICSID Convention), to which neither Canada nor 
Mexico has adhered.78 In practical terms, this means that the normal 
                                                                                                                      
76 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3) (2005) (emphasis added). 
77 See Andrea J. Menaker, Benefiting from Experience in the United States Most Recent Invest-
ment Agreements, 12 U.C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 121, 122 (2005). 
78 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals 
of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159; see ICSID, List of Con-
tracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention, http://www.worldbank.org/ic- 
sid/constate/c-states-en.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2007) (showing all the CAFTA-DR na-
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International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
Arbitration Rules79 and secretariat services are available for investor-
state disputes (in addition to other rules), except for the Dominican 
Republic, while under NAFTA, only the ICSID Additional Facility 
Rules are available at ICSID.80 
 Third, while U.S. firms (and Canadian firms) have in the past 
made significant use of investor-state arbitration in the NAFTA con-
text and otherwise, there is little history of investor-state dispute set-
tlement among the member countries of CAFTA-DR other than the 
United States.81 Whether this is due more to significant efforts to re-
solve disputes through negotiation, the high cost of international ar-
bitration, relatively low volumes of intra-Central American investment, 
cultural differences, or some other factor or factors is beyond the 
scope of this discussion. 
 Fourth, the text of Chapter 10, which is highly similar to the in-
vestment provisions of earlier U.S. agreements, strongly suggests that 
Chapter 10 is essentially a U.S. originated (rather than a jointly nego-
tiated) document. The other six Parties’ input appears limited pri-
marily to the reservations and certain limitations in the party-specific 
annexes, particularly with respect to sectors in which national treat-
ment is not required for foreign investors. As the USTR Summary of 
the Agreement states: 
                                                                                                                      
tions as members, but not Mexico or Canada) [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. Canadian 
authorities signed the Convention on December 15, 2006, but its entry into force for Can-
ada awaits enactment of implementing legislation in several Canadian Provinces. News 
Release, Foreign Affairs and Int’l Trade Canada, Canada Signs International Convention 
on Investment Dispute Resolution (Dec. 19, 2006), available at http://w01.interna- 
tional.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.aspx?isRedirect=True&publication_id=384696&Languag
e=E&docnumber=160. 
79 ICSID, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, http://www.worldbank. 
org/icsid/basicdoc/partF.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2007). 
80 The Additional Facility Rules are available to disputes where either the investor or 
the host state is an ICSID party, but not both. They would be available for any disputes 
under NAFTA as between the U.S. and Mexico or the U.S. and Canada, but not between 
Mexico and Canada. See ICSID, ICSID Additional Facility Rules (2006), available at http:// 
www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/AFR_English-final.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2007) [here-
inafter ICSID Additional Facility Rules]. 
81 Of 106 completed and 104 pending ICSID and ICSID Additional Facility cases, only 
two have involved a Central American country (Costa Rica and El Salvador), and none 
were between Central American-DR nations and investors. See ICSID, List of Concluded 
Cases, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/conclude.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2007); 
ICSID, List of Pending Cases, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pending.htm (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2007). 
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Its [Chapter 10] provisions reflect traditional standards incor-
porated in early U.S. investment agreements (including those 
in the North American Free Trade Agreement and U.S. bilat-
eral investment treaties) and in customary international law, 
and contain certain innovations incorporated in the [U.S.] 
free trade agreements with Chile and Singapore as well as 
others.82 
The basic text appears to have been imposed (with or without objec-
tion) on the other negotiating parties. 
 Fifth, the NAFTA case law (and other investor-state case law) is 
relevant to possible investor-state arbitrations under CAFTA-DR, despite 
that fact that “[a]n award made by a [CAFTA-DR] tribunal shall have 
no binding force except between the disputing parties and in respect of 
the particular cases.”83 The issue is not “binding force” or precedent, 
but whether tribunal members, likely experienced arbitrators from one 
or more of the CAFTA-DR parties and/or from outside the region, will 
pay attention to prior tribunal decisions on the same or similar issues, 
particularly when rendered under legal provisions that are identical or 
closely similar. Experience under NAFTA has demonstrated that tribu-
nal members consider and discuss earlier arbitral decisions, even if tri-
bunal members do not necessarily treat them as binding precedent. 
Even if the tribunal members did not wish to do so, they usually have 
little choice, because both the investor and the host state will cite prior 
decisions that tend to support their arguments before the tribunal. In 
future investor-state arbitrations under CAFTA-DR, the parties will 
likely refer the tribunals to prior NAFTA and to any other arbitral deci-
sions that involve the interpretation of similar treaty provisions. 
                                                                                                                      
82 USTR, Summary of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free 
Trade Agreement, at 12, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilat- 
eral/CAFTA/Transmittal/asset_upload_file888_7818.pdf (last visited May 5, 2007) [here-
inafter USTR Summary] (emphasis added). 
83 See CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, art. 10.26.4. 
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1. Coverage of Investments and Investors 
 As with NAFTA,84 CAFTA-DR investment coverage is broad, apply-
ing to “measures adopted or maintained by a Party relating to  . . . inves-
tors of another party” and to “covered investments.”85 The “covered in-
vestments” are defined broadly to include: (1) an enterprise; (2) shares 
of stock or other forms of equity participation; (3) loan instruments; (4) 
futures, options, and other derivatives; (5) turnkey, construction, con-
cession, and other contracts; (6) intellectual property rights; (7) li-
censes, authorizations, and permits issued under domestic law; and (8) 
various tangible, intangible, movable or immovable property, and re-
lated property rights.86 However, not all transactions taking one of these 
forms will be covered “investments.” Among other things, the invest-
ment must have “the characteristics of an investment, including such 
characteristics as the commitment of capital or other resources, the ex-
pectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk.”87 
 Claims with regard to sovereign debt instruments are covered, 
but if the claim relates to a short-term instrument (less than one 
year), the claim cannot be filed until more than one year from the 
date of events (e.g., default) on which the claim is based.88 An order 
or judgment from a court or administrative tribunal is not an invest-
ment.89 Not only direct governmental actions, but also actions by state 
enterprises and others exercising regulatory or administrative author-
ity are covered.90 Except with regard to performance requirements 
and investment and environment,91 Chapter 10 is not applicable to an 
“act or fact . . . or any situation that ceased to exist before the date of 
entry into force of this Agreement.”92 This language presumably es-
                                                                                                                      
84 Many BITs also define investment broadly, and ICSID tribunals, despite the re-
quirement in Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention that a dispute must involve an invest-
ment, have tended to take an expansive view of the concept. See Raul Emilio Vinuesa, Bilat-
eral Investment Treaties and the Settlement of Investment Disputes Under ICSID: The Latin American 
Experience, 8 L. & Bus. Rev. Am. 501, 513–16 (2002) (discussing the treatment of a dispute 
involving purchase of certain debt instruments as a dispute over an investment). 
85 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, art. 10.1.1. A “covered investment” is defined in Ar-
ticle 2.1 as an investment, defined in Article 10.28 (Definitions) “in its territory of an in-
vestor of another Party in existence as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement or 
established, acquired, or expanded thereafter . . . .” 
86 Id. ch. 10, art. 10.28. 
87 Id. 
88 See id. Annex 10-E, ¶ 3. 
89 See id. ch. 10, art. 10.28. 
90 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, art. 10.1.2. 
91 Id. ch. 10, arts. 10.9, 10.11. 
92 Id. ch. 10, art. 10.1.3. 
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tablishes a basic rule of non-retroactivity, but would not bar a claim 
based on a course of conduct by a party violating the Section A obliga-
tions that began before entry into force but continued afterward. 
 The definition of “investor of a Party” is also broad. It includes “a 
Party or state enterprise thereof, or a national or an enterprise of a 
Party, that attempts to make, is making, or has made an investment in 
the territory of another Party.”93 (The state enterprise is apparently 
covered only when it exercises regulatory, administrative, or other 
governmental authority that has been delegated to it by the govern-
ment.94) However, unlike many bilateral investment treaties, CAFTA-
DR deals explicitly with the dual national problem, since the benefits 
of Chapter 10 are available to “investors of another party.”95 That is, the 
benefits are not available to Party’s own national for an investment in 
its own territory. Consequently, Chapter 10 provides that a natural 
person claiming jurisdiction under the Agreement “shall be deemed 
to be exclusively a national of the State of his or her dominant and 
effective nationality.”96 This effectively codifies the general principle 
of international law applicable to dual nationals.97 
 Consistent with this approach, the Agreement also permits a 
Party to deny Chapter 10 benefits to companies nominally operating 
in another Party, if the owners have no substantial business activities 
within CAFTA-DR other than in the Party denying the benefits, and 
persons of a non-Party, or of the denying Party, are the owners of the 
enterprise.98 This language deals with two different situations. First, it 
has presumably been intended, at least in part, to preclude nationals 
of one CAFTA-DR Party (e.g., Guatemala) from using a corporation 
formed in the United States (without substantial business activities 
there) from seeking the benefits of protection under Chapter 10 for 
their investments in Guatemala. Secondly, if, for example, a Korean 
firm sets up a corporate subsidiary in Nicaragua, but has no substan-
tial business activities in Nicaragua, the Nicaraguan subsidiary lacks 
standing to bring a Chapter 10 action against the United States based 
on the Korean firm’s investment in the United States. 
                                                                                                                      
93 Id. ch. 10, art. 10.28. 
94 Id. ch. 10, art. 10.1.2. 
95 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, art. 10.1.1(a). 
96 See id. (referring to Annex 2.1). 
97 See Rudolf Dolzer & Margrete Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties 34 
(1995). 
98 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, art. 10.12.2. 
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 CAFTA-DR, like NAFTA, also prevents the Parties from having to 
offer Section A benefits to nationals of nations with which the offering 
Party does not have diplomatic relations or where rules and regulations 
on prohibited transactions would be violated.99 This is presumably de-
signed to prevent, for example, a Cuban-owned enterprise in one of the 
CAFTA-DR countries from enforcing Chapter 10 rights against the 
United States. 
 The provisions of Chapter 10 prevail against inconsistent provi-
sions in other chapters generally, but do not apply with regard to gov-
ernment measures that may also be covered by the financial services 
chapter (12).100 
2. National Treatment and Most Favored Nation Treatment 
 The key protections in most investment protection agreements 
are those relating to national treatment, most favored nation treat-
ment, fair and equitable treatment and expropriation, and these pro-
visions of NAFTA are those that have been subject to the greatest vol-
ume of litigation.101 The concept of national treatment, as reflected in 
CAFTA-DR Article 10.3, is simple in theory: 
Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treat-
ment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circum-
stances, to its own investors with respect to the establishment, 
acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and 
sale or other disposition of investments in its territory.102 
 Applying such a non-discrimination principle is not always easy in 
practice. Among the issues that have arisen under NAFTA are what 
constitutes “in like circumstances” and whether there must be evi-
dence of intent to discriminate, with the key decisions being Pope & 
Talbot v. Canada103 and S.D. Myers.104 The former related to a dispute 
                                                                                                                      
99 Id. ch. 10, art. 10.12.1. 
100 Id. ch. 10, art. 10.2. 
101 See NAFTA, supra note 30, arts. 1102, 1103, 1105, 1110. 
102 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, at ch. 10, art. 10.3. 
103 See Pope & Talbot v. Can. (Pope & Talbot III), Award on the Merits of Phase Two, 
Fair and Equitable Treatment (NAFTA Arbitration Apr. 10, 2001), http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/Award_Merits-e.pdf (the third major Pope & Talbot de-
cision, addressing national treatment and fair and equitable treatment). 
104 See S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, 40 I.L.M. 1408 (2001); see also In re 
Cross-Border Trucking Servs. (Mex. v. U.S.), Secretariat File No. USA-MEX-98-2008-01 
(NAFTA Arbitration Feb. 6, 2001), ¶¶ 248, 249, http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/app/Doc- 
Repository/1/Dispute/english/NAFTA_Chapter_20/USA/ub98010e.pdf (a Chapter 20 
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over treatment of export quotas under a U.S.-Canada agreement, and 
resulted in a determination that the national treatment provisions of 
NAFTA were not violated, on the ground that different classes of 
lumber producers and exporters that were actually in like circum-
stances were not treated differently. The latter turned on Canadian 
government regulations which effectively precluded the export of 
hazardous wastes for processing in the United States so as to assure 
that Canadian wastes would be processed by a Canadian firm in Al-
berta; a violation of Article 1102 (national treatment) was found. In 
another case, Feldman v. Mexico,105 a tribunal decided that foreign and 
domestic cigarette resellers were in like circumstances, but not for-
eign resellers and domestic cigarette manufacturers. 
 Most favored nation treatment, in NAFTA and in CAFTA-DR, is 
designed to assure that investors of one party are not treated in a dis-
criminatory manner with regard to investors of another treaty party or 
investors with rights under a separate investment treaty with the host 
government. The CAFTA-DR language, virtually identical to that in 
NAFTA, provides: 
Each Party shall accord to investors [covered investments] of 
another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, 
in like circumstances, to investors of any other Party or of any 
non-Party with respect to the establishment, acquisition, ex-
pansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other 
disposition of investments in its territory.106 
 This language has not been tested extensively under the NAFTA 
investment provisions, but was applied by a Chapter 20 NAFTA tribu-
nal in Cross Border Trucking Services. In that case, Mexico claimed that 
the United States was violating NAFTA’s most favored nation invest-
ment (and services) clauses by permitting Canadian investment in 
U.S. trucking firms while denying Mexican investors the same oppor-
tunities.107 It may be that under an agreement with seven state parties 
instead of only three, most-favored-nation issues will arise more fre-
quently than they have under NAFTA. This is particularly true for any 
CAFTA-DR Parties that have an extensive network of bilateral invest-
                                                                                                                      
dispute interpreting identical language in Article 1202 regarding services). The author 
served as one of the panelists. 
105 See Feldman v. Mexico, 42 I.L.M. 625 (2003) (the author served as one of the mem-
bers of the tribunal). 
106 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, art. 10.4.1. 
107 Cross Border Trucking Servs., Secretariat File No. USA-MEX-98-2008-01, ¶ 297. 
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ment treaties, because an investor can seek the applications of more 
favorable provisions (if any) in alternative treaties through the most 
favored nation clause in Chapter 10.108 
3. Minimum Standard of Treatment 
 Among the most complex obligations under Section A of the in-
vestment chapter is the obligation to provide a minimum standard of 
treatment, particularly fair and equitable treatment, to foreign inves-
tors. The concept here is again relatively simple. What if the host state 
treats both foreign investors and its own citizens in an arbitrary and 
unreasonable manner? This would not violate a national treatment 
standard, but it would fall afoul of a fair and equitable treatment re-
quirement. Full protection and security, in recent U.S. treaty practice 
at least, refers largely to police protection in the event of mob vio-
lence and the like. CAFTA-DR provides that “Each Party shall accord 
to covered investments treatment in accordance with customary in-
ternational law, including fair and equitable treatment and full pro-
tection and security.”109 
 This language is substantively identical to NAFTA, except that 
NAFTA does not include the term “customary” before “international 
law.”110 However, the NAFTA Parties attempted to eliminate the confu-
sion as to the extent to which “customary international law” meant 
something different (and more narrow) from “international law,” by 
issuing a binding “Interpretation” of NAFTA Chapter 11.111 The Inter-
pretation stated, inter alia, that “[t]he concepts of ‘fair and equitable 
treatment’ and ‘full protection and security’ do not require treatment 
in addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary inter-
national law minimum standard of treatment of aliens.”112 A full discus-
sion of the proper scope of fair and equitable treatment and what con-
stitutes the minimum standard of treatment under customary interna-
                                                                                                                      
108 See CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, art. 10.5. There is an ongoing discussion re-
garding whether jurisprudence regarding most-favored nation principles governing trade 
(e.g., GATT, Article I) should be applicable when most-favored nation issues are raised 
under investment treaty provisions, as with CAFTA-DR, Article 10.5. 
109 Id. 
110 NAFTA, supra note 30, art. 1105(1). 
111 Id. art. 1131(2) (providing that “An interpretation by the [Free Trade] Commission 
of a provision of this Agreement shall be binding on a Tribunal established under this 
Section.”); see CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10 (art. 10.23.2 incorporates similar language). 
112 See NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 
Provisions, ( July 31, 2001), http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-Interpr-en.asp? 
format=print [hereinafter NAFTA Notes of Interpretation] (last visited Feb. 13, 2007). 
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tional law is well beyond the scope of this Article.113 However, it is noted 
here that the Interpretation was designed in part to counteract one of 
the early Pope & Talbot decisions, in which the tribunal unwisely de-
cided that the NAFTA fair and equitable treatment was in addition to 
what was required under international law.114 
 Thus, for subsequent FTAs, including CAFTA-DR, the U.S. nego-
tiators apparently decided to make it more difficult for tribunals to 
make mischief with fair and equitable treatment. Accordingly, CAFTA-
DR “for greater certainty” contains more specific definitions and limi-
tations. First: 
The concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” and “full pro-
tection and security” do not require treatment in addition to 
or beyond that which is required by that [customary interna-
tional law minimum] standard, and do not create additional 
substantive rights.115 
Secondly: 
“[F]air and equitable treatment” includes the obligation not 
to deny justice116 in criminal, civil or administrative adjudica-
tory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due 
process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world 
. . . .117 
This language also reflects NAFTA experience, and a perceived need 
to instruct future tribunals on how to deal with situations in which the 
                                                                                                                      
113 See, e.g., Ian A. Laird, Betrayal, Shock and Outrage—Recent Developments in NAFTA Arti-
cle 1105, in NAFTA—Investment Law and Arbitration: Past Issues, Current Prac-
tice, Future Prospects 49 (Todd Weiler ed., 2004); Gantz, Evolution, supra note 46, at 
708–30. 
114 Pope & Talbot v. Can. (Pope & Talbot III), Award on the Merits of Phase Two, Fair 
and Equitable Treatment, ¶¶ 114–115, (Apr. 10, 2001), http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-
nac/documents/Award_Merits-e.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2007); see also David A. Gantz, 
International Decisions: Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 937, 942–947 
(2003) (discussing more fully fair and equitable treatment in Pope & Talbot III). 
115 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, art. 10.5.2. 
116 “Denial of justice exists when there is a denial, unwarranted delay or obstruction of 
access to courts, gross deficiency in the administration of judicial or remedial process, 
failure to provide those guarantees which are generally considered indispensable to the 
proper administration of justice, or a manifestly unjust judgment. An error of a national 
court which does not produce manifest injustice is not a denial of justice.” Harvard Re-
search Draft, art. 9, quoted in Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 
506–07 (6th ed. 2003). 
117 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, art. 10.5.2(a). 
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tribunal is effectively reviewing a national court or administrative de-
cision for consistency with CAFTA-DR Chapter 10. Denial of justice 
has been addressed in at least two NAFTA decisions, Loewen, Mondev 
International Ltd. v. United States118 and Waste Management v. Mexico,119 
although no clear standard has yet been articulated in the NAFTA 
jurisprudence.120 
 Thirdly, the CAFTA-DR parties decided to define customary in-
ternational law: 
The Parties confirm their shared understanding that “cus-
tomary international law” generally . . . results from a gen-
eral and consistent practice of States that they follow from a 
sense of legal obligation. With regard to Article 10.5 [mini-
mum standard of treatment], the customary international 
law minimum standard of treatment of aliens refers to all 
customary international law principles that protect the eco-
nomic rights and interests of aliens.121 
These particular clarifications reflect U.S. Trade Promotion Authority 
language, quoted at length above, which effectively requires that 
standards “for fair and equitable treatment [be] consistent with 
United States legal principles and practice, including the principle of 
due process.”122 As one U.S. government attorney has asserted, 
“These clarifications do not change the nature of the substantive obli-
gations . . . instead, they merely elucidate, for the benefit of tribunals 
charged with interpreting the treaty, the Parties’ intent in agreeing to 
those obligations.”123 They also seem designed, however, to narrow 
the choices for members of future tribunals, despite the fact that a 
tribunal, such as the one in Loewen, would still have to decide the re-
quirements of a denial of justice under customary international law, 
and despite the fact that a tribunal, such as that in Pope & Talbot, 
would still have to decide what constitutes the minimum standard re-
                                                                                                                      
118 42 I.L.M. 85 (2003). 
119 43 I.L.M. 967 (2004). 
120 See Andrea K. Bjorklund, Reconciling State Sovereignty and Investor Protection in Denial 
of Justice Claims, 45 Va. J. Int’l L. 809, 849–860 (2005) (discussing the tribunals’ treatment 
of denial of justice and concluding that the “tribunals have not, however, entirely agreed 
on the progress made in the intervening seventy-five years [since the Mexican General 
Claims Commission cases], and they have not announced appreciably clearer or more 
useful standards.”). 
121 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, Annex 10-B. 
122 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3)(E) (2002); see infra Part III.A. 
123 Menaker, supra note 77, at 122. 
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quired under international law for fair and equitable treatment, a 
standard that is determined by looking at state practice. Whether it 
will discourage arbitrators from looking at other sources of interna-
tional law124 in determining that standard, such as earlier arbitral de-
cisions and any of the several thousand bilateral investment treaties in 
force (or even U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence), remains to be 
seen. 
4. Direct and Indirect Expropriation 
 Expropriation is probably the single most complex and politically 
sensitive area in investment treaties, as suggested in the earlier discus-
sion of regulatory takings and the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Con-
stitution. For all the discussion and commotion, there has been only 
one tribunal decision under NAFTA that resulted in a finding of ex-
propriation, Metalclad v. United Mexican States.125 Despite the rather 
weak reasoning of the tribunal, Metalclad involved an arguably “gar-
den variety” expropriation. Metalclad was deprived of the use and en-
joyment of its hazardous waste disposal facility by state authorities, 
purportedly to create an “ecological preserve.”126 Indirect or “creep-
ing” expropriations are covered by NAFTA as well as by CAFTA-DR, 
yet to date none has been found; Methanex, noted earlier, is the only 
decision to date where conceivably that result might have occurred. 
 However, notwithstanding that case history, the broad expropria-
tion language of both agreements, by itself, would suggest that the crit-
ics are not paranoid. The basic language of CAFTA-DR is instructive: 
No Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered investment 
either directly or indirectly through measures equivalent to 
expropriation or nationalization (“expropriation”), except: 
 (a) for a public purpose; 
                                                                                                                      
124 See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, Jun. 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 
3 Bevans 1179 (establishing a hierarchy of sources of international law: international con-
ventions; international custom; general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
judicial decisions and the teachings of publicists “as subsidiary means for the determina-
tion of rules of law.”). Some scholars, such as expert NAFTA Chapter 11 attorney Todd 
Weiler, argue that this additional language (whether in the NAFTA Interpretation or in 
CAFTA-DR) simply defines the standard as customary international law, leaving the ques-
tion of the substance of the obligation as applied by tribunals in particular cases, subject to 
being informed by treaty, custom and/or general principles of international law. E-mail 
from Todd Weiler to Author (Sept. 18, 2006, 21:41:00) (on file with author). 
125 Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, 40 I.L.M. 36, 44 (2001). 
126 Id. at 44. 
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 (b) in a non-discriminatory manner; 
 (c) on payment of prompt, adequate and effective com-
pensation in accordance with paras. 2 through 4;127 and 
 (d) in accordance with due process of law and Article 
10.5.128 
 This language differs somewhat from NAFTA, but primarily in 
non-substantive respects. NAFTA also covered both direct and indirect 
expropriation, but contained a confusing term “tantamount to expro-
priation” which now reads “equivalent to expropriation,” generally fol-
lowing the interpretation of the term endorsed by the tribunal in S.D. 
Myers.129 The language does not really deal with the key problem, which 
is deciding what constitutes an indirect expropriation. Most actual or 
alleged expropriations in recent years, and certainly those in the 
NAFTA and Central American countries, are not situations in which the 
army marches into a foreign owned facility and seizes it.130 Rather, they 
are indirect takings, sometimes called “creeping” expropriations, where 
one or more government actions accidentally or intentionally make it 
impossible for a foreign investor to continue to operate. 
 Nor are the four conditions a great deal of assistance, since they 
kick in only after the existence of an expropriation has been found 
under the “chapeau.” Moreover, as long as fair compensation is re-
quired, it does not make much difference in the final analysis whether 
the expropriation meets the other three standards. Traditionally, a 
sovereign government can nationalize without second-guessing as 
long as it pays fair compensation, and tribunals seem loath to decide 
whether a particular action is for a public purpose. However, under 
both NAFTA and CAFTA-DR, tribunals might be more likely to order 
restitution of the property seized by the expropriating government in 
                                                                                                                      
127 Paragraphs 2–4 of Article 10.7 require payment without delay based on the fair 
market value of the investment, fully realizable and fully transferable in convertible cur-
rency or at a fair rate of conversion, plus interest. CAFTA-DR, supra note 3. 
128 Id. ch. 10, art. 10.7.1. 
129 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, 40 I.L.M. 1408, 1440 (2001). 
130 This has happened most recently in Bolivia, where soldiers were ordered to occupy 
the natural gas fields in May 2006. Notisur South American Political and Economic Affairs, 
Bolivia: President Evo Morales Nationalizes Natural Gas Resources, May 12, 2006, 2006 WLNR 
8238298. See generally David A. Gantz, The Marcona Settlement: New Forms of Negotiation and 
Compensation for Nationalized Property, 71 Am. J. Int’l. L. 474 (1977) (discussing the take-
over, in 1975, by the Peruvian army of an American company’s iron ore mine and smelter, 
and the compensation negotiations that followed). 
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an “illegal” expropriation, even through the expropriating govern-
ment has the option of paying monetary damages.131 
 CAFTA-DR does expand, however, on the NAFTA expropriation 
language in several important respects, which may well make it some-
what more difficult for claimants to convince tribunals to find indirect 
expropriations or actions equivalent to expropriations that would oth-
erwise require compensation: 
The Parties confirm their shared understanding that: 
1. Article 10.7.1 is intended to reflect customary interna-
tional law concerning the obligation of States with respect to 
expropriation. 
2. An action or a series of actions by a Party cannot consti-
tute an expropriation unless it interferes with a tangible or in-
tangible property right or property interest in an investment. 
3. Article 10.7.1 addresses two situations. The first is direct 
expropriation, where an investment is nationalized or oth-
erwise directly expropriated through formal transfer of title 
or outright seizure. 
4. The second situation addressed by Article 10.7.1 is indi-
rect expropriation, where an action or series of actions by a 
Party has an effect equivalent to direct expropriation without 
formal transfer of title or outright seizure. 
 (a) The determination of whether an action or series of 
actions by a Party, in a specific fact situation, constitutes an 
indirect expropriation, requires a case-by case, fact-based in-
quiry that considers, among other factors: 
 (i) the economic impact of the government action, although the 
fact that an action or series of actions by a Party has an ad-
verse effect on the economic value of an investment, standing 
alone, does not establish that an indirect expropriation has 
occurred; 
 (ii) the extent to which the government action interferes 
with distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations; and 
 (iii) the character of the government action. 
 (b) Except in rare circumstances, nondiscriminatory regu-
latory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to pro-
tect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, 
                                                                                                                      
131 See NAFTA, supra note 30, art. 1135.1(b); CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, art. 
10.26.1(b). 
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safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect expro-
priations.132 
 Some of these are significant changes, some not, but all affect the 
ticklish determination of what actions may constitute an indirect ex-
propriation.133 Paragraph 1, relating to customary international law, 
reflects concepts already discussed. Paragraph 2 seeks to limit expro-
priations to property rights. What is not a property right that the 
United States wishes to exclude from coverage? Perhaps this is in-
tended to clarify that market access alone is not a property, right, or 
perhaps it partially reflects Methanex, where the company was allegedly 
deprived of its opportunity to sell methane because its customers in 
California could no longer produce MTBE. Perhaps the objective is to 
distinguish the rights “related to” investments from cases based pri-
marily on trading activities rather than on investment per se, as with 
Ethyl,134 Pope & Talbot, S.D. Myers, and Feldman. 
 Paragraph 3 provides a specific, but non-controversial, definition 
of direct expropriation. Paragraph 4 deals with the thorny issue of 
defining what constitutes an indirect expropriation or taking, and re-
flects U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, specifically the Penn Central 
approach.135 Paragraph 4(a) directs a case-by-case approach, focusing 
on a non-exclusive series of considerations, including the economic 
impact of the government on the investor, the investor’s reasonable 
expectations, and the character of the government action. (Presuma-
bly, this goes to some extent to motive, and to whether the govern-
ment was seeking to force an investor out of business or has other, less 
suspect objectives.) 
 The most significant part is likely paragraph 4(b), which estab-
lishes the presumption that a group of regulatory actions designed to 
protect legitimate public welfare objectives (including, but not limited 
                                                                                                                      
132 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, Annex 10-C (emphasis added). 
133 See Menaker, supra note 77, at 123 (explaining that “the annex [to post NAFTA in-
vestment provisions] sets forth a number of factors that tribunals should take into consid-
eration when determining whether an indirect expropriation has occurred”). 
134 Ethyl Corp. v. Canada (Award on Jurisdiction), 38 I.L.M. 708 (1999). Once the tri-
bunal found jurisdiction, and the federal government lost an international Canadian arbi-
tration, the Canadian government effectively terminated the administrative action that 
had resulted in a ban on Ethyl’s sale in Canada of a gasoline additive manufactured in the 
United States. See id. See generally Alan C. Swan, NAFTA-Private Investor Challenge to Canadian 
Restrictions on Import and Trade-Jurisdiction of Arbitral Tribunal-Place of Arbitration, 94 Am. J. 
Int’l L. 159 (2000) (discussing the case and its nature as a trade rather than an invest-
ment dispute). 
135 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130–138 (1978). 
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to, those enumerated) will be excluded from treatment as a com-
pensable indirect expropriation. However, the language, again reflect-
ing Penn Central, does not require the “appropriation” of the property, 
only that the effect of the government action constitutes an expropria-
tion. What impact this will have is difficult to assess unless and until 
there are tribunal actions under CAFTA-DR, the Chile and Singapore 
FTAs, or others agreements with this language. Some, including this 
author, have expressed the concern that excluding a broad class of 
regulatory actions from treatment as an expropriation would be an 
invitation to clever, perhaps unscrupulous, government officials to 
craft a regulation that is non-discriminatory on its face, but is never-
theless designed or applied in such a manner as to put a certain for-
eign company or group of companies out of business. At a minimum, 
such a definition raises the burden of proof for foreign claimants ar-
guing that regulatory actions were in fact expropriatory.136 Perhaps 
the “except in rare circumstances” language will give the tribunals a 
reasonable opportunity to treat government actions otherwise fitting 
the exception as expropriatory nevertheless, as the U.S. Supreme 
Court did in Lucas.137 
5. Performance Requirements 
 The performance requirements section of CAFTA-DR gives for-
eign investors somewhat greater specificity than the WTO’s Agreement 
on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs),138 by providing a 
more expansive list of what constitutes banned performance require-
ments. Additionally, it includes a series of exceptions, for example, for 
compliance with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights (TRIPS) and for the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) Article XX exceptions for “compliance with laws 
and regulations that are not inconsistent with this Agreement,” and for 
measures (including environmental measures) “necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health” or “related to the conservation 
                                                                                                                      
136 Gantz, Evolution, supra note 46, at 764–65. 
137 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–32 (1992) (majority of the 
Court determined that a state regulation of beachfront property, depriving the claimant of 
essentially all productive use of his property, constituted a compensable taking). 
138 Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures, Annex 1a to the Marrakech 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 14, 1994, available at http:// 
www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/18-trims.doc (last visited Feb. 13, 2007) [hereinafter 
TRIMS]. 
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of living or non-living exhaustible natural resources.”139 Also, unlike 
TRIMs, Chapter 10 effectively provides a private right of (investor) ac-
tion. Performance requirements have not been a major issue in NAFTA 
litigation. Although a claim was made in both Pope & Talbot and S.D. 
Myers, the tribunal rejected it in both instances.140 Article 10.9 bars the 
usual tie-ins—exporting a given level of goods or services produced, 
maintaining a given level of domestic content, relating import volume 
or value to exports or to the availability of foreign exchange, limiting 
sales based on export volume, technology transfer requirements, and 
exclusive supply arrangements. None of these requirements may be 
imposed, “in connection with the establishment, acquisition, expan-
sion, management, conduct, operation, or sale or other disposition of 
an investment of an investor of a Party or of a non-Party in its territory 
. . . .”141 
 Similarly, the receipt of government benefits or advantages may 
not be conditioned on achieving domestic content, local purchase, or 
export requirements.142 There are exceptions for intellectual property 
rights when the Party is in compliance with the WTO TRIPs Agree-
ment; enforcing its anti-competition laws; if non-discriminatory meas-
ures are imposed which are necessary to secure compliance with laws 
and regulations otherwise consistent with the Agreement; or to pro-
tect human, animal or plant life and health or related to conservation 
of living or non-living exhaustible natural resources.143 These later 
two provisions, including the “necessary” terminology, closely track 
GATT 1994, Article XX, and may well be implemented in a similarly 
narrow manner, including the limitation of “necessary” to permit cer-
tain measures where no less trade restrictive measure is available.144 
                                                                                                                      
139 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, art. 10.9; see General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade art. 20(b), (d), (g), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, available at http:// 
www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.doc (last visited May 5, 2007) [hereinafter 
GATT]; TRIMS, supra note 137, art. 3 (the latter incorporating all GATT exceptions into 
TRIMS). 
140 Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, Interim Award (NAFTA Arbitration June 26, 2000), 
40 I.L.M. 258, ¶¶ 73, 75, 76, (2001) (expropriation issues, merits), available at http://www. 
naftaclaims.com; S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, 40 I.L.M. 1408, 1439–40 
(2001). 
141 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, art. 10.9.1. 
142 Id. ch. 10, art. 10.9.2. 
143 Id. ch. 10, art. 10.9.3(b)-(c). 
144 See Appellate Body Report, Korea-Measures Effecting Fresh, Chilled, and Frozen Beef, 
WTO/DS161/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000), ¶¶ 155, 161–62, WTO/DS161/AB/R, available at 
http://www.wto.org (citing GATT arts. 20(b), 20(e) and discussing how “necessary” means 
something close to “indispensable,” not simply “making a contribution to”). 
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Of course, one should not assume that NAFTA arbitrators will neces-
sarily follow the GATT jurisprudence in interpreting these CAFTA-DR 
provisions. 
6. Investment, Labor, and the Environment 
 CAFTA-DR contains an environmentally friendly sounding excep-
tion, investment and the environment: 
Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party 
from adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any measure oth-
erwise consistent with this Chapter that it considers appropri-
ate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is under-
taken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns.145 
In the NAFTA context identical language146 has had essentially no sig-
nificance; it was mentioned, but dismissed in S.D. Myers.147 The provi-
sion was circular: the environment could be protected, but enforce-
ment had to be “otherwise consistent with this agreement.” However, as 
noted earlier, in NAFTA there is no presumption against treating envi-
ronmental regulatory actions as indirect expropriation. Arguably, the 
same language in CAFTA-DR could have a more substantive impact, as 
it may be cited to reinforce the presumption in Annex 10-C(4)(b) that 
environmental regulation is not normally to be considered to be a 
compensable taking. 
 NAFTA reflected concerns on the part of some in the United 
States that lax labor or environmental regulation would be used as a 
means of attracting investment to Mexico, and they have attempted to 
discourage this by stating that: 
The Parties recognizes that it is inappropriate to encourage 
investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or environ-
mental measures. Accordingly, a Party should not waive or 
otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise 
derogate from, such measures as an encouragement for the 
                                                                                                                      
145 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, art. 10.11. 
146 See NAFTA, supra note 30, art. 1114(a). 
147 See S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, 40 I.L.M. 1408, 1461–62 (2001) 
(separate opinion of Dr. Brian Schwartz) (characterizing Article 1114 of NAFTA “as ac-
knowledging and reminding interpreters of chapter 11 (investment) that the parties take 
both the environment and open trade very seriously and that means should be found to 
reconcile these two objectives . . . .”). 
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establishment acquisition, expansion or retention in its terri-
tory of an investment of an investor.148 
NAFTA also provided for consultations in the event of possible viola-
tions. Even if this language were somehow relating to the later-drafted 
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation,149 CAFTA-DR con-
tains the identical first sentence in both the labor and the environ-
mental chapters, but is somewhat weaker on the follow-up, whereby the 
Party is to “strive to ensure that it does not waive or otherwise derogate 
from . . . .”150 CAFTA-DR also lacks the explicit right of consultation. 
7. Miscellaneous Provisions 
 Other provisions in section A cover such matters as investor in-
terests in the case of armed conflict and civil strife,151 a provision that 
does not appear in NAFTA although perhaps it could be incorporated 
on the basis of NAFTA’s most favored nation clause applicable to state 
obligations to foreign investors, Article 1103. In CAFTA-DR, the Par-
ties are to “accord to investors of another Party, and to covered in-
vestments, non-discriminatory treatment with regard to measures it 
adopts or maintains relating to losses suffered by investments in its 
territory owing to armed conflict or civil strife;” if the investor’s prop-
erty is requisitioned or destroyed by government forces to an extent 
not required by the “necessity of the situation,” compensation is re-
quired.152 Guatemala has taken a reservation to the latter.153 
 Funds transfers, performance requirements, and choice of senior 
management, among others, are also covered and are all adapted with 
minor modifications from the parallel NAFTA provisions. The transfer 
provisions of CAFTA-DR cover the range of possible income sources, 
including capital contributions, profits, dividends, capital gains, inter-
est, royalty payments, and those payments arising out of a dispute.154 
The transfers must be available freely and without delay, in a freely us-
able currency, and include returns in kind when covered by an agree-
ment.155 Exceptions are preserved for bankruptcy, insolvency, securities 
                                                                                                                      
148 NAFTA, supra note 30, art. 1114.2. 
149 North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), Sept. 13, 1993, avail-
able at http://www.naalc.org/english/agreement.shtml (last visited May 5, 2007). 
150 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, arts. 16.2.2, 17.2.2 (emphasis added). 
151 Id. ch. 10, art. 10.6. 
152 Id. ch. 10, arts. 10.6.1–2. 
153 Id. ch. 10, Annex 10-D. 
154 Id. ch. 10, art. 10.8.1. 
155 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, arts. 10.8.1–3. 
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dealings, criminal offenses, financial reporting, records needed for law 
enforcement, and compliance with judgments.156 
 In CAFTA-DR, like NAFTA, investors retain the discretion to 
chose senior management and boards of directors without regard to 
nationality, but investors must follow normal national requirements 
that a majority of the board of directors be of the host country’s na-
tionality, unless that requirement were to “materially impair the ability 
of the investor to exercise control over its investment.”157 
8. Exceptions and Reservations for Non-Conforming Measures 
 Finally, there is an exception in Chapter 10 for non-conforming 
measures. These provisions preserve the Parties’ rights to protect exist-
ing non-conforming measures at the central government, regional or 
local government level when those measures are set out in a Party’s 
Annex I (existing non-conforming measures that are preserved).158 
However, they apply only to certain Section A benefits, national treat-
ment, most favored nation treatment, performance requirements and 
senior management. They do not free annex or non-conforming 
measures from the obligations relating to the minimum standard of 
treatment or expropriation, among others. The section also bars new 
laws covered by the Party’s Annex II (permitting existing and new non-
conforming restrictions), from forcing an investor to dispose of his in-
vestment based on the investor’s nationality.159 
 The reservations in Annexes I and II of CAFTA-DR are set out on 
a country-by-country basis, and in many instances are extensive. For 
example, in Costa Rica’s Annex I, under “Cross Border Services and 
Investment” the following reservation appears: 
A concession is required to perform any type of develop-
ment or activity in the maritime-terrestrial zone [200-meter 
strip along the entire coastline]. Such a concession shall not 
be granted to or held by: (a) foreign nationals that have not 
resided in the country for at least five years; (b) enterprises 
with bearer shares; (c) enterprises domiciled abroad; (d) en-
terprises incorporated in the country solely by foreign na-
tionals; or (e) enterprises where more than fifty percent of 
the capital shares or stocks are owned by foreigners. 
                                                                                                                      
156 Id. ch. 10, art. 10.8.4. 
157 Id. ch. 10, art. 10.10. 
158 Id. ch. 10, art. 10.13.1. 
159 Id. ch. 10, art. 10.13.2. 
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Within the maritime-terrestrial zone, no concession may be 
granted within the first 50 meters counted from the high 
tide line nor in the area comprised between the high tide 
line and the low tide line.160 
 As is obvious, in the absence of its status as a reserved non-
conforming measure, this proviso discriminates against foreigners in 
conflict with Article 10.3 regarding national treatment and might be 
subject to challenge as well under Article 10.5 (minimum standard of 
treatment). (Even so, Annex I does not override the “fair and equita-
ble treatment” rights of investors.) Costa Rica is not alone. In Annex I, 
U.S. reservations cover, inter alia, atomic energy, mining, air transpor-
tation, and radio communications. These restrictions are not neces-
sarily outright bans on foreign investment, but they typically restrict 
foreign investment in the enumerated sectors.161 
III. Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
 In addition to a series of investor rights, CAFTA-DR, like all U.S. 
BITs and most U.S. FTAs,162 contains provisions for mandatory inter-
national arbitration of investor-state disputes. Substantively, there are 
relatively few major differences between the mechanisms set forth in 
CAFTA-DR and those in NAFTA. Certain procedural modifications 
have been made, and provisions relating to transparency of the arbi-
tral proceedings based on several NAFTA Commission decisions have 
been incorporated into the text of CAFTA-DR. Both agreements fol-
low now-traditional procedures first developed in international com-
mercial arbitration with regard to such matters as consultations, 
choice of arbitrators, procedural due process, and the like. Despite 
certain CAFTA-DR specific requirements, however, most of the proce-
dural aspects of investor-state arbitration are governed by the arbitra-
tion rules chosen by the disputing parties, either those of ICSID163 or 
of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.164 
                                                                                                                      
160 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, Annex I (Costa Rica), I-CR-9. 
161 Id. Annex I (United States), passim. 
162 Except, as noted earlier, the Australia and Jordan FTAs. 
163 See ICSID, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, supra note 79. 
164 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976), GA Res. 31/98, available at http://www.un- 
citral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf (last visited May 5, 2007). 
CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, art. 10.16.5 (“[t]he arbitration rules applicable under 
paragraph 3, and in effect on the date the claim or claims were submitted to arbitration 
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 If non-binding consultations and negotiations165 are unsuccessful 
in resolving the dispute, the claimant, either on her own behalf or on 
behalf of an enterprise (a legal entity) controlled by the claimant, may 
lodge a claim that the responding Party has breached one of its obliga-
tions under Section A.166 However, in a significant addition to the cov-
erage provided in NAFTA, Chapter 11, claims may also be brought for 
breach of an “investment authorization” or “investment agreement.”167 
CAFTA-DR defines an “investment authorization” as “an authorization 
that the foreign investment authority of a Party grants to a covered in-
vestment of an investor of another party . . . .”168 (The United States has 
no such authority as the term is used here, so this protection is mean-
ingless for foreign investment into the United States.) 
 “Investment agreement” is defined as a: 
[W]ritten agreement that takes effect on or after the date of 
entry into force of this Agreement between a national author-
ity of a Party and a covered investment or an investor of an-
other Party that grants the covered investment or investor 
rights: (a) with respect to natural resources or other assets 
that a national authority controls; and (b) upon which the 
covered investment or the investor relies in establishing or ac-
quiring a covered investment other than the written agree-
ment itself . . . .169 
 The right of an investor to challenge not only a violation of inter-
national law as embodied in the protections of Section A, but also a 
breach of an investment authorization or agreement, could signifi-
cantly increase the potential scope of jurisdiction of investor-state dis-
pute settlement, particularly in countries where the requirement of 
formal government approval of certain investments is a common prac-
tice. Reliance on government approvals also becomes an explicit factor 
in determining jurisdiction over a state. Without this language, a 
breach of an investment authorization or agreement could not be chal-
lenged unless it also constituted a breach of a Section A obligation. 
                                                                                                                      
under this Section, shall govern the arbitration except to extent modified by this Agree-
ment.”). 
165 Id. ch. 10, art. 10.15. 
166 Id. ch. 10, art. 10.16(1). 
167 Id. 
168 Id. ch. 10, art. 10.28. 
169 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, art. 10.28 (“national authority” means the author-
ity of the central government only, not that of any state or local entity, per Article 10.28, 
footnote 13). 
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 The Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations, re-
viewing CAFTA-DR, was particularly impressed by these additions: 
“The Committee stresses the importance of covering both investment 
authorizations and agreements, and cannot urge strongly enough that 
these provisions must be part of all future agreements.”170 
A. Notice, Choice of Forum, and Consent 
 CAFTA-DR contains several notice requirements. First, at least 
ninety days before a claim can be submitted to arbitration, a “notice 
of intention to submit a claim to arbitration” must be filed with the 
respondent state. The claimant is required to specify, in addition to 
names and addresses, the particular provisions of Section A or of the 
investment authorization or investment agreement for which a breach 
is claimed, the “legal and factual basis for each claim,” as well as the 
relief sought and the approximate damages claimed.171 This requires 
something more than simple “notice” pleading, given the language 
about the legal and factual basis for each claim. With the similarity of 
this language to NAFTA,172 claimants under CAFTA-DR can draw on 
the NAFTA practice, in which the notice of intent is typically ten to 
fifteen pages,173 and it is probably reasonable to assume that the 
CAFTA-DR Free Trade Commission174 will eventually issue guidelines 
for such notices, as has occurred in NAFTA.175 While this NAFTA 
document is effectively a recommendation and thus not binding on 
claimants, it does state that if the form is properly completed it “will 
satisfy the requirement of Article 1119.”176 
                                                                                                                      
170 U.S. Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA): Report of the Advisory 
Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations (ACTPN), Mar. 12, 2004, at 5, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA_Reports/asset_ 
upload_file367_5932.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2007). 
171 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, art. 10.16.2. 
172 See NAFTA, supra note 30, art. 1119. 
173 See, e.g., Kenex Ltd. v. United States, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitra-
tion, Jan. 14, 2002, http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Kenex/KenexNoticeOf- 
Intent.pdf; Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbi-
tration, July 21, 2003, http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Glamis/Glamis-Intent. 
pdf. But see Methanex v. United States, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration, 
July 2, 1999, http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/MethanexNoticeOfIn- 
tent.pdf. 
174 Cabinet level representatives of the Parties, as established under Article 19.1. See 
CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 19, art. 19.l. 
175 Statement of the Free Trade Commission on Notices of Intent to Submit a Claim to 
Arbitration, Oct. 7, 2004, available at http://www.naftaclaims.com/Papers/NoticeIntent-
en.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2007). 
176 Id. 
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 The more important notice is, of course, the notice of arbitra-
tion, which cannot be filed until “six months have elapsed since the 
events giving rise to the claim . . . .”177 This six-month period is pre-
sumably designed to allow the claimant and the government an op-
portunity for settlement negotiations. If the claimant meets the six 
months requirement, and ninety days has elapsed since the commu-
nication of the notice of intent, as noted above, the claimant may 
submit her claim, designating one of the three rule/forum options 
provided under the Agreement, the ICSID Convention and the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules, the ICSID Additional Facility Rules,178 or the U.N. 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration 
Rules.179 (UNCITRAL, unlike ICSID, provides no secretariat, so par-
ties seeking arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules must arrange for 
secretariat services at either ICSID, another existing arbitration secre-
tariat, or make ad hoc arrangements.) 
 For most disputes under CAFTA-DR, there will not really be three 
alternatives, but only two—the ICSID Arbitration Rules and the UN-
CITRAL Arbitration Rules, since all the CAFTA-DR Parties other than 
the Dominican Republic are also Parties to the ICSID Convention.180 
(For the Dominican Republic alone, the alternatives would be the IC-
SID Additional Facility Rules and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.) 
The ICSID Secretariat is authorized to administer conciliation and 
arbitration proceedings under the ICSID Additional Facility rules “for 
the settlement of legal disputes arising directly out of an investment 
which are not within the jurisdiction of the Centre because either the 
State party to the dispute or the State whose national is a party to the 
dispute is not a Contracting State” or proceedings “which are not 
within the jurisdiction of the Centre because they do not arise directly 
out of an investment, provided that either the State party to the dis-
pute or the State whose national is a party to the dispute is a Contract-
ing State . . . .”181 For the six CAFTA-DR Parties that are also parties to 
                                                                                                                      
177 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, art. 10.16.3. 
178 See ICSID, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, supra note 79. For arbi-
tration under ICSID, the arbitration is governed by relevant provisions of both the ICSID 
Convention and the ICSID Arbitration Rules. Where the ICSID Additional Facility Rules 
are used, as either the host state or the investor’s home state is not a party to ICSID, only 
the Additional Facility Rules themselves govern the arbitration. See id. 
179 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, art. 10.16.3. 
180 Of course, the investor and state can always agree on a different mechanism. (The 
Dominican Republic signed the ICSID Convention in March 2000, but has not ratified it.) 
181 ICSID Additional Facility Rules, supra note 80, art. 2. 
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the ICSID Convention,182 the ICSID Secretary General would not be 
authorized to administer a dispute involving a CAFTA-DR investor 
and a state under the Additional Facility, unless the Secretary General 
were to determine that it did not arise directly out of an investment. 
The “investment” requirement is embodied in the ICSID Convention 
itself, but is not defined there.183 It is in theory conceivable—
although very unlikely—that a claim based on provisions of an in-
vestment authorization or investment agreement under CAFTA-DR, 
or a claim considered an investment under NAFTA, might not be con-
sidered a dispute arising “directly out of an investment” and thus be 
shifted from the ICSID Arbitration Rules to the ICSID Additional Fa-
cility Rules. 
 Notice is considered delivered when received by the ICSID Secre-
tary General (for arbitrations under either of the ICSID rules) or by 
the respondent (for arbitration under UNCITRAL). Under the ICSID 
Convention, the Secretary General acts as registrar, and at least in 
theory may refuse to register a claim if, for example, in his view it 
does not “arise directly out of an investment” or does not otherwise 
meet the rules of the Convention.184 In contrast, if a claim is filed un-
der the UNCITRAL Rules with the respondent state, the arbitral tri-
bunal will presumably decide any jurisdictional issues, although there 
is a risk that the respondent state will refuse to cooperate. At the time 
the notice is submitted, the claimant is to provide the name of the 
arbitrator she wishes to appoint or consent in writing to appointment 
by the ICSID Secretary General185 as appointing authority. 
 To avoid confusion, particularly when the notices are to be filed 
under UNCITRAL with the respondent state rather than the ICSID 
Secretary General, CAFTA-DR provides specific addresses for claimant 
delivery of notices and other documents.186 This should make it more 
                                                                                                                      
182 See ICSID Convention, supra note 78. 
183 Id. art. 25 (provides in pertinent part that “[t]he jurisdiction of the Centre shall ex-
tend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State 
[or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre 
by that State] and a national of another Contracting State”). 
184 Id. arts. 11, 25. According to one authority, Todd Weiler, the ICSID Secretariat re-
fused to register the “Baha Beach” claim against Mexico because the investors could not 
provide proof of authorization by each named claimant to proceed. E-mail from Todd 
Weiler to Author (Feb. 26, 2007, 17:21:00) (on file with author); see also Notice of Intent to 
Supply a Claim, Billy Joe Adams et al., Nov. 10, 2000, available at http://naftaclaims.com/ 
Disputes/Mexico/Adams/AdamsNoticeOfIntent.pdf (last visited May 5, 2007) (listing more 
than 100 potential claimants a taking of their property in Baha, California). 
185 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, art. 10.16.6. 
186 Id., ch. 10, art. 10.27, Annex 10-G. 
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difficult for respondents to argue that they have not received timely 
notices and other served documents. 
 CAFTA-DR,187 like virtually all U.S. FTA investment chapters and 
BITs, constitutes the necessary written consent by the governments to 
the jurisdiction of ICSID, “an agreement in writing” under the New 
York Convention”188 and an “agreement” the Inter-American Conven-
tion.189 Thus, a CAFTA-DR Party cannot refuse to arbitrate because it 
did not consent to the arbitration. 
 For the claimant, of course, there has been no prior consent to 
arbitration (unless it was contained in an investment agreement), and 
in CAFTA-DR, as in NAFTA, a prospective claimant must meet a 
number of procedural requirements in order for arbitration under 
Chapter 10 to proceed. First, there is a statute of limitations. “No 
claim may be submitted to arbitration under this Section of more 
than three years have elapsed from the date on which the claimant 
first acquired, or should have first acquired, knowledge of the breach 
alleged” and that either the claimant or enterprise “has incurred loss 
or damage.”190 For a case that is based on an ongoing series of actions 
or measures that allegedly conflict with state obligations under Sec-
tion A, this may mean that any recovery will be limited to damages for 
no more than the most recent three years after the claim is filed 
(unless of course the claimant only recently discovered a course of 
action by the government that was ongoing for many years). This 
three-year window for seeking arbitration may be significantly nar-
rowed if the claimant, once becoming aware of the potential breach, 
fails to pursue any advisable consultations on negotiations, and sub-
mission of the notice of intent, promptly.191 
 Secondly, the claimant must formally consent to the arbitration.192 
Third, CAFTA-DR contains what amounts to a “no u-turn” provision for 
                                                                                                                      
187 Id. ch. 10, art. 10.17. 
188 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbi-
tral Awards, June 10, 1958, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbi- 
tration/NY-conv/XXII_1_e.pdf (last visited May 5, 2007). 
189 Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 
1975, O.A.S.T.S. No. 42, 14 I.L.M. 336 (1975), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/dis- 
pute/comarb/iacac/iacac2e.asp (last visited May 5, 2007). 
190 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, art. 10.18.1. 
191 In Feldman, the claimant had alleged a continuing course of conduct going back 
not only more than three years, but for several years before NAFTA entered into force, and 
had not filed his NAFTA claim at the earliest possible time. Under these circumstances, 
although a majority of the tribunal found a violation of NAFTA’s national treatment provi-
sions, damages were limited to the three year period. 42 I.L.M. 625, 634–35 (2003). 
192 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, art. 10.18.2(a). 
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investors of most Parties but a “fork in the road” provision for U.S. in-
vestors in the other Parties.193 The claimant or enterprise is required, as 
a condition of arbitration, to waive the right to initiate or continue ad-
ministrative tribunal or court proceedings under the law of any party 
(presumably local law in virtually all cases), except for interim injunc-
tive relief not seeking monetary damages.194 (For U.S. investors, once 
an action challenging a Party action as a violation of Section A is lodged 
in a local court or tribunal, arbitration under Section B is pre-
cluded.195) Provisions of this type are related to the fact that under 
CAFTA-DR, as with most such investment protection agreements, the 
traditional customary requirement that a claimant exhaust local and 
administrative remedies before bringing an international claim196 does 
not exist.197 Similar language is found in NAFTA.198 
 The CAFTA-DR provisions do not on their face appear to require 
a choice between international arbitration or local court action at the 
outset. Rather once arbitration is initiated, the local option is no 
longer available, so existing actions must be terminated and new ones 
cannot be initiated.199 However, this choice may be more apparent 
than real for U.S. investors, as an annex essentially provides that when 
a U.S. investor files a claim against one of the Central American Par-
ties or the Dominican Republic, the election is definitive—should a 
breach of Section A be lodged first in a local court or administrative 
tribunal, “the investor may not thereafter submit the claim to arbitra-
tion under Section B.”200 (The investor may protect herself in the lo-
cal court action if the investor only alleges violations of local law.) 
                                                                                                                      
193 See Mark Kantor, Investor-State Arbitration Over Investments in Financial Services: Dis-
putes Under New U.S. Investment Treaties, 121 Banking L.J. 579, 593–94 (2004) (discussing 
the fork-in-the-road and exhaustion rules in the 2004 U.S. Model BIT). 
194 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, arts. 10.18.2(b)-3. 
195 Id. Annex 10-E. 
196 See Brownlie, supra note 116, at 472–74; ICSID Convention, supra note 78, art. 26 
(a Contracting State may require the exhaustion of local remedies as a condition to its 
acceptance of ICSID jurisdiction). 
197 See Loewen Group Inc. v. United States (Award), 42 I.L.M. 811, 811 (2003). Under 
NAFTA jurisprudence if the claimant is effectively challenging the validity of a national 
court decision the bar is higher; she must essentially demonstrate a denial of justice under 
international law, not simply that the result might otherwise have been a denial of fair and 
equitable treatment under Article 1105. See id.; see also Azinian v. United Mexican States, 39 
I.L.M. 537, 555 (2000); Loewen, Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States, 42 I.L.M. 85, 109–10 
(2003). 
198 See NAFTA, supra note 30, art. 1121.2(b). 
199 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, art. 18.2(b). 
200 Id. Annex 10-E. 
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 The rule for investment authorizations or investment agreements 
challenges (rather than Section A challenges) is even more explicit 
that once a choice is made, it is irrevocable. If a potential CAFTA-DR 
Chapter 10 claimant “has previously submitted the same alleged 
breach to an administrative tribunal or court of the respondent, or to 
any other binding dispute settlement procedure, for adjudication or 
resolution” the claimant is barred from the Chapter 10 remedy.201 
Whether tribunals will actually refuse to hear such claims remains to 
be seen. Jurisprudence under various BITs suggests that claims may be 
allowed to proceed if there is no identity of parties and issues, or if 
the local claim was premised on local law alone, with the international 
claim being premised on international law as reflected in the BIT or 
FTA investment provisions202 (or, by analogy, on the Section A lan-
guage of CAFTA-DR). 
B. The Arbitral Process 
 Under CAFTA-DR, as under NAFTA and most other similar in-
vestment agreements, there are normally three arbitrators, two ap-
pointed by the parties, and the third appointed by agreement of the 
parties. If the parties do not agree within seventy-five days after sub-
mission of the claim—a frequent occurrence—the third arbitrator is 
appointed by the ICSID Secretary General (even if the arbitration is 
taking place under the UNCITRAL rules).203 The respondent state is 
deemed to have agreed (with prejudice to objection on grounds other 
than nationality), and the claimant must agree in writing, to ap-
pointment of the three arbitrators, for purposes of the ICSID Conven-
tion and the ISCID Additional Facility rules.204 
 In general, the conduct of the arbitration is consistent with the 
rules applicable under the relevant arbitral rules and NAFTA, with one 
significant exception. As is usual, the tribunal determines the “place” of 
arbitration after consultation with the parties.205 (This is important, 
                                                                                                                      
201 Id. ch. 10, art. 10.18.4. 
202 See Ronald S. Lauder and The Czech Republic, (Final Award), (Sept. 3, 2001), availa-
ble at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Lauder-Czech-FinalAward-3Sept2001.pdf 
(last visited May 5, 2007) (describing lack of identity of parties and issues); OEPC v. Ecuador, 
Case No. 3467, ( July 1, 2004), available at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/ 
Occidental-Ecuador-FinalAward-1Jul2004.pdf (stating different legal questions addressed 
before the tribunal compared to those raised in national courts) (last visited May 5, 2007). 
203 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, arts. 10.19.1–3. 
204 Id. ch. 10, art. 10.19.4. 
205 Id. ch. 10, art. 10.20.1. 
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because in the case of ICSID Additional Facility or UNCITRAL arbitra-
tion, it determines which national courts would have jurisdiction over 
any challenges to the award. For ICSID arbitrations, the only challenge 
is in theory to an ICSID Annulment Committee,206 but when a judg-
ment is entered in a national court, some additional challenges may 
nevertheless be possible.) The tribunal may order “[i]nterim measures 
of protection,” essentially to preserve the status quo pending adjudica-
tion of the claim.207 Respondents are also barred from asserting as a 
defense that all or part of a claim is covered by insurance,208 presuma-
bly in order to protect the interests of the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation, or any similar agency that issues political risk and other 
forms of insurance in any of the CAFTA-DR countries.209 
 There are some innovations. As in NAFTA, a “non-disputing Party” 
may present its views either orally or in writing to the tribunal “regard-
ing the interpretation of this Agreement.”210 This has happened occa-
sionally in NAFTA,211 and may be more frequent in CAFTA-DR, be-
cause in each dispute there are likely to be six, rather than only two, 
non-disputing Parties (which include the investor’s government). Most 
significantly, and unlike NAFTA, CAFTA-DR states: 
Without prejudice to a tribunal’s authority to address other 
objections as a preliminary question, a tribunal shall address 
and decide as a preliminary question any objection by the 
respondent that, as a matter of law, a claim submitted is not 
a claim for which an award in favor of the claimant may be 
made under Article 10.26 [awards] . . . .212 
 When a jurisdictional objection is submitted by the respondent 
state in accordance with the requirements of this section (within forty-
five days after the constitution of the tribunal), the tribunal “shall de-
cide on an expedited basis,” suspending proceedings on the merits, 
                                                                                                                      
206 ICSID Convention, supra note 78, art. 52. 
207 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, art. 10.20.8. 
208 Id. art. 10.20.7. 
209 See OPIC, Doing Business with Us: Latin America and the Caribbean, http:// 
www.opic.gov/doingbusiness/ourwork/latinamerica/index.asp (last visited Feb. 13, 2007). 
210 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, art. 10.20.2. 
211 See, e.g., Feldman v. Mexico, Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Submission of the United 
States on Preliminary Issues (Oct. 6, 2000), available at http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/ 
Mexico/Feldman/FeldmanUS1128Jurisdiction.pdf (last visited May 5, 2007); Second 
Submission of Canada Pursuant to Article 1128 (Oct. 6, 2000), available at http://nafta- 
claims.com/Disputes/Mexico/Feldman/FeldmanCanada1128Jurisdiction.pdf (last visited 
May 5, 2007). 
212 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, art. 10.20.4. 
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and “issue a decision or award on the objection(s) within 150 days” sub-
ject to extension under certain circumstances.213 The tribunal may 
award costs and attorneys’ fees in such proceedings in circumstances in 
which tribunal considers the claim or the respondent’s objection “frivo-
lous,” and by implication in other situations as well.214 This provision is 
presumably designed to discourage “frivolous” actions by private claim-
ants, and to assure (or at least to strongly encourage) tribunals to de-
cide what are effectively motions to dismiss or motions for summary 
judgment in U.S. parlance as preliminary matters, rather than to com-
bine them with decisions on the merits. Separately, CAFTA-DR explic-
itly authorizes a tribunal under CAFTA-DR to “award costs and attor-
neys’ fees in accordance with this Section and the applicable arbitration 
rules.”215 Recent NAFTA tribunals have not been reluctant to award 
costs and attorneys’ fees largely or entirely to the prevailing party when 
the tribunal felt it was appropriate,216 and the inclusion of the “frivo-
lous” language may encourage CAFTA-DR tribunals to do the same. 
 This language likely results from U.S. frustration with several 
NAFTA Chapter 11 proceedings in which dismissal on jurisdictional 
grounds required several years of proceedings,217 or was combined 
                                                                                                                      
213 Id. ch. 10, art. 10.20.5. 
214 Id. ch. 10, art. 10.20.6; see Menaker, supra note 77, at 127–28 (explaining the award 
of costs provision). 
215 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, art. 10.26.1. 
216 In Methanex II and International Thunderbird Gaming Corp., the arbitral tribunals 
broke with what had been standard procedure of dividing the arbitral costs evenly between 
the parties, with each bearing its own legal fees, and taxed the losing party—the private 
claimant in both instances—with all or most of the arbitral costs and the other (govern-
ment) party’s legal fees. Methanex v. United States (Methanex II), Final Award on Jurisdic-
tion and Merits, 2005, at 300-01 (2005), http://www.naftaclaims.com (follow “Disputes” 
hyperlink; then follow “USA” hyperlink; then follow “Methanex” hyperlink); Int’l Thun-
derbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, Jan. 26, 2006, ¶ 222, http://www.nafta- 
claims.com/Disputes/Mexico/Thunderbird/Thunderbird_Award.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 
2007) (requiring Thunderbird to pay three-quarters of the arbitration costs and most of 
Mexico’s outside legal fees). This “loser pays” practice, although common in international 
arbitration generally, and specifically contemplated in Article 40 of the UNCITRAL Rules 
(which governed both proceedings), obviously could have a chilling effect on the willing-
ness of claimants lacking deep pockets, and their attorneys, to lodge new claims under 
NAFTA and similar investment provisions. 
217 See generally, e.g., Methanex v. United States (Methanex I), Preliminary Award on Ju-
risdiction, 42 I.L.M. 514 (2002). The Notice of Arbitration was submitted Dec. 2, 1999, and 
the Preliminary Award on Jurisdiction was issued on Aug. 7, 2002, about two and a half 
years later (the chronology of the case is available at http://www.naftaclaims.com/dis- 
putes_us_6.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2007)); Waste Management v. Mexico, 40 I.L.M. 57, 
57 (2001) (in which the elapsed time between the Notice of Arbitration (Sept. 29, 1998) 
and dismissal on jurisdiction ( June 2, 2000) was twenty-one months). The chronology is 
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with a decision on the merits.218 While the problem, if any, seems 
mostly a question of tribunals finding it difficult to decide jurisdic-
tional issues promptly, rather than refusing to sever jurisdictional is-
sues from the merits, there will likely be times when the two are suffi-
ciently entwined as to make it impractical to consider them separately. 
This is probably most likely to occur, where, for example, evidence to 
be developed in the course of the proceeding will be relevant to juris-
dictional questions as well as substantive ones. In any event, CAFTA-
DR claimants are on notice to be prepared for jurisdictional objec-
tions at the outset. 
 Several other provisions relating to the conduct of the arbitration 
are worth noting. As in NAFTA,219 a CAFTA-DR tribunal may, at the 
request of a disputing party or, in the absence of their objection, on 
its own initiative, appoint “one or more experts to report to it in writ-
ing on any factual issue concerning environmental, health, safety or 
other scientific matters raised by a disputing party . . . .”220 This is 
without prejudice to the possibility of appointing other kinds of ex-
perts if permitted by the applicable arbitration rules221 (which nor-
mally is not the case without the permission of the parties). Given that 
the arbitrators are in most cases likely to be experts in investment law, 
the possible need for bringing in expertise in these other areas is ob-
vious. 
 There is also provision for consolidating two or more claims that 
have “a question of law or fact in common and arise out of the same 
events or circumstances,” at the request of a disputing party and with 
the agreement of the disputing party, subject to certain procedural 
requirements concerning the request and the appointment of arbitra-
tors in consolidated cases.222 Consolidation has been accepted only 
once to date under NAFTA, at the initiative of the respondent United 
States, with regard to three claims alleging violations of Section A aris-
                                                                                                                      
available at http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes_mexico_waste.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 
2007). 
218 In Loewen Group v. United States, the tribunal did issue an Award on Jurisdiction on 
Jan. 5, 2001, some 27 months after the Notice of Arbitration (Oct. 3, 1998). 42 I.L.M. 811 
(2003). However, in that award, the tribunal effectively dismissed the United States’ juris-
diction objections on a preliminary basis and joined them to the merits, and did not ulti-
mately decide the case until June 26, 2003 (and then on a different jurisdictional basis). Id. 
at 850. In Feldman, some of the jurisdictional issues were decided in a preliminary decision, 
while others were joined to the merits. 42 I.L.M. 625, 633–37 (2003). 
219 See NAFTA, supra note 30, art. 1133. 
220 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, art. 10.24. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. ch. 10, art. 10.25. 
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ing out of the antidumping and countervailing duty orders imposed 
by U.S. authorities on softwood lumber imports from Canada.223 
C. Transparency 
 Transparency of the proceedings was an area that was addressed 
with regard to NAFTA only after the fact, but was addressed directly in 
the text with CAFTA-DR. All of the major documents (notice of intent, 
notice of arbitration, pleadings, memorials and briefs, submissions re-
lating to protected information, minutes or transcripts of the hearings, 
orders, awards, and decisions) must be made public “promptly.”224 
Hearings are to be open to the public.225 In all instances, there is an 
exception for protected information and procedures for protecting 
such information against unauthorized disclosure,226 with the further 
exception that a respondent may nevertheless disclose otherwise pro-
tected information when required by law.227 CAFTA-DR also authorizes 
the tribunal to “accept and consider amicus curiae submissions from a 
person or entity that is not a disputing party.”228 
 This explicit language reflects concerns raised by NGOs and some 
U.S. government officials regarding the lack of transparency and of 
NGO access to the NAFTA Chapter 11 process, which some think has 
contributed to skepticism of the process within the United States. For 
example, under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, a popular mecha-
nism under Chapter 11, the process was not transparent, as neither the 
written nor the oral proceedings were open to the public. 229 However, 
the degree of transparency of the process was increased significantly 
beginning in July 2001, when the governments stated that “nothing in 
NAFTA imposes a general duty of confidentiality” and agreed that they 
would “make available to the public in a timely manner all documents 
submitted to, or issued by, Chapter 11 tribunals” subject to certain ex-
                                                                                                                      
223 Canfor Corp. v. United States, Tembec v. United States, Terminal Forest Products 
Ltd. v. United States, Order of the Consolidation Tribunal, Dec. 17, 2005, ¶ 226, available 
at http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Softwood/Softwood-ConOrder.pdf (last visited 
May 5, 2007). 
224 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, art. 10.21.1. 
225 Id. ch. 10, art. 10.21.2. 
226 Id. ch. 10, arts. 10.21.2–4. 
227 Id. ch. 10, art. 10.21.5. 
228 Id. ch. 10, art. 10.20.3. 
229 See ICSID Additional Facility Rules, supra note 80, art. 39 (giving the tribunal au-
thority to decide, with the Parties’ consent, what persons may be admitted to the hearing; 
publication of the minutes of the hearing requires the Parties’ consent under Article 44). 
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ceptions for confidential or privileged information.230 In October 2003, 
Canada and the United States, but not Mexico, issued statements indi-
cating that they would consent—and request disputing investors and 
tribunals to consent—to holding hearings that are open to the public, 
subject to measures to protect confidential business information.231 At 
the same time, a statement was issued setting forth procedures for non-
disputing party (amicus curiae) participation in Chapter 11 proceed-
ings.232 The language in these NAFTA Commission statements was the 
model for the CAFTA-DR provisions on transparency. 
D. Applicable Law 
 As noted in the discussions of Section A, the scope of “interna-
tional law” and “customary international law” has been an issue under 
the NAFTA case law, NAFTA Commission interpretations, and, ulti-
mately, in the drafting of CAFTA-DR. As in NAFTA, CAFTA-DR tribu-
nals are directed to decide cases under Section A “in accordance with 
this Agreement and applicable rules of international law.”233 In a 
number of NAFTA cases, among others, the references to “interna-
tional law” relate not only to substantive international law provisions 
on investment, when not specified in NAFTA, but also to procedural 
law, particularly to the rules of interpretation set out in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.234 
 With regard to cases arising under investment authorizations or 
investment agreements, the tribunal is to apply the rules of law speci-
fied in the relevant agreements, agreed upon by the parties, or, in the 
                                                                                                                      
230 NAFTA Notes of Interpretation, supra note 111, pts. A(1), A(2). 
231 Foreign Affairs and Int’l Trade Canada, Statement of Canada on an Open Hearing 
in NAFTA Chapter Eleven Arbitrations, Oct. 7, 2003, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nafta-
alena/open-hearing-en.asp (last visited May 5, 2007). 
232 See United States Trade Representative, Statement of the Free Trade Commission 
on Non-Disputing Party Participation, Oct. 2003, http://www.ustr.gov/assets/trade_agree- 
ments/regional/nafta/asset_upload_file45_3600.pdf; Press Release, United States Trade 
Representative, NAFTA Commission Announces New Transparency Measures (Oct. 7, 
2003), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2003/October/ 
NAFTA_Commission_Announces_New_Transparency_Measures.html. The United States is 
not a party to the Vienna Convention, but generally accepts its provisions as customary 
international law. 
233 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, art. 10.22.1. 
234 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 
39/27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/eng- 
lish/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf (last visited May 5, 2007). In particular, Articles 31–32 
have been cited by many NAFTA and other tribunals as the basis for interpreting “the 
Agreement and applicable rules of international law.” See, e.g., Metalclad Corp. v. United 
Mexican States, 40 I.L.M. 36, 46 (2001) (the first NAFTA decision on the merits). 
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event of no such specification or agreement, the law of the respon-
dent state (including its conflicts of laws rules) and “such rules of in-
ternational law as may be applicable.”235 
 As in NAFTA, the Commission236 has the power to issue an inter-
pretation of the provisions of the investment chapter, which “shall be 
binding on the tribunal . . . .”237 Unlike NAFTA, however, CAFTA-DR 
adds “and any decision or award issued by the tribunal must be consis-
tent with that decision.”238 This addition is presumably designed to deal 
with tribunals such as the one in Pope & Talbot, which, having received a 
Commission Interpretation, nevertheless considered carefully whether 
it would follow the Interpretation or ignore it, ultimately rather huffily 
agreeing that it was binding.239 CAFTA-DR (like NAFTA) provides a 
mechanism whereby a respondent state, when arguing that an alleged 
breach is within one of the exceptions in Annexes I or II, may request 
the Commission to interpret the annex at issue. The Commission is to 
issue a decision on the request within sixty days of the request. If the 
Commission fails to issue the decision within that period, the tribunal 
may proceed to decide the issue without the Commission’s input.240 
 Whether the issuance of formal Commission “interpretations” (or 
decisions under Annexes I or II) will turn out to be more common un-
der CAFTA-DR than the issuance of interpretations under NAFTA— 
once in thirteen years—remains to be seen. One might speculate that 
the difficulties of getting three sovereign governments to agree (1) that 
the issuance of an interpretation was warranted; and (2) how that in-
terpretation should be worded, would be even more complicated un-
der an agreement with seven members of the Free Trade Commission. 
Annex I and II decisions, at least, are subject to a specific deadline, al-
though it is problematic whether agreement can be reached when deal-
ing with complex and controversial issues.241 (Needless to say, Commis-
sion interpretations will be easier to bring about than any formal 
amending of the Agreement.) 
                                                                                                                      
235 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, art. 10.22.2. 
236 Established under CAFTA-DR, ch. 19, § A, as the trade ministers of the seven Par-
ties or their designates. 
237 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, art. 10.22.3; NAFTA, supra note 30, art. 1131.2. 
238 Id. ch. 10, art. 10.22.3. 
239 Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, Award in Respect of Damages (NAFTA Arbitration 
May 31, 3002), 41 I.L.M. 1347, ¶¶ 23–79, 80. 
240 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, art. 10.23; NAFTA, supra note 30, art. 1132.1. 
241 CAFTA-DR permits the Commission to “establish its own rules and procedures.” 
However, Commission decisions are to be “taken by consensus unless the Commission 
otherwise decides.” CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 19, art. 19.1.5. 
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E. Awards and Challenges 
 The basic awards language in CAFTA-DR is little changed from 
NAFTA,242 except that in the former, awards, finality, and enforcement 
are addressed in a single article instead of in several articles. Awards are 
limited to monetary damages, or to giving the respondent state the op-
tion of providing restitution of property or monetary damages plus in-
terest.243 If an enterprise has brought the claim, the award of monetary 
damages and interest or restitution shall be provided to the enterprise. 
Issues regarding who may have a right to the “relief” are decided under 
domestic law.244 No punitive damages may be awarded.245 
 There is, however, one major innovation, an interim review pro-
cedure. CAFTA-DR provides that: 
In any arbitration conducted under this Section, at the re-
quest of a disputing party, a tribunal shall, before issuing a de-
cision or award on liability, transmit its proposed decision or 
award to the disputing parties and to the non-disputing Par-
ties. Within 60 days after the tribunal transmits its proposed 
decision or award, the disputing parties may submit written 
comments to the tribunal concerning any aspect of its pro-
posed decision or award. The tribunal shall consider any such 
comments and issue its decision or award not later than 45 
days after the expiration of the 60-day comment period.246 
This procedure is apparently designed to permit the parties (most 
likely the respondent state) to comment on the award before it be-
comes final, similar to the review process afforded WTO Members in-
volved in panel proceedings before the WTO DSB.247 
 The awards language and other provisions of CAFTA-DR Chapter 
10, as in NAFTA, provide little useful guidance to tribunals in deter-
mining the amount of the award, or the rate and period of interest, 
except when an expropriation is found. Under Article 10.7, there are 
detailed guidelines for determining the amount of compensation and 
the calculation of interest for takings coming within the scope of Arti-
                                                                                                                      
242 See NAFTA, supra note 30, arts. 1125–1126. 
243 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, art. 10.26.1. 
244 Id. ch.10, art. 10.26.2. 
245 Id. ch.10, art. 10.26.3. 
246 Id. ch. 10, art. 10.20.6. 
247 See DSU, supra note 44, art. 15 (applicable only to panel decisions, not to decisions 
of the WTO Appellate Body); Menaker, supra note 77, at 128 (noting the similarity of this 
investment decision review procedure to that used in the WTO). 
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cle 10.7.248 For other violations of Section A, or for violations of in-
vestment authorizations or investment agreements (unless the latter 
specify calculation of damages), having found “that the claimant has 
incurred loss or damage by reason of, or arising out of, that 
breach,”249 the tribunals are left to their own to develop a proper 
measure of damages. Nevertheless, in the four cases under NAFTA in 
which the tribunal awarded damages, calculation of the amounts did 
not prove a major problem for the tribunal. As the arbitrators deemed 
appropriate, they used adjusted book value,250 the amount of the un-
contested losses sustained by the claimant,251 a type of going concern 
value,252 and the approximate costs of the claimant because of the re-
spondent’s denial of fair and equitable treatment.253 
 Enforcement of an award is deferred for 120 days in the case of 
ICSID Convention arbitration, and 90 days in the event the arbitration 
was conducted under the ICSID Additional Facility or UNCITRAL 
Rules; then the award may be enforced if no party has requested an-
nulment under ICSID or revision under the other two mechanisms.254 
An award by a tribunal operating under the ICSID Convention Arbitra-
                                                                                                                      
248 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, arts. 10.7.2–4. Arguably, a tribunal that found a 
taking that failed to comport with the expropriation requirements of Article 10.7 might 
take the position that the measure of compensation specified in that provision was inappli-
cable. See ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, ¶¶ 480–
482, Oct. 2, 2006, available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ADCvHungaryAward.pdf 
(last visited May 5, 2007) (holding that where there had been an unlawful expropriation 
under a bilateral investment treaty specifying only “just compensation,” it was appropriate 
for the tribunal to use a higher, customary international law standard of compensation, in 
that instance the market value of the investments as of the date of the award). However, 
under CAFTA-DR, a very explicit compensation standard is provided in Article 10, specify-
ing fair market value at the time of the taking, and it seems unlikely that a tribunal would 
apply a different standard. CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, art. 10.7.2(b). 
249 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, arts. 10.16.1(a)(ii) and 1(b)(ii). 
250 See Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, 40 I.L.M. 36, 51–54 (2001) (book 
value was essentially used because the enterprise had never actually begun its operations; 
the tribunal equated fair and equitable treatment damages and expropriation damages 
because Metalclad had been deprived entirely of the use of its investment). 
251 See Feldman v. Mexico, 42 I.L.M. 625, 665–667 (2003) (allowing only amount of 
cigarette tax refunds the majority believed were denied to claimant in violation of the na-
tional treatment provisions, plus interest, but denying other damage claims, including that 
based on expropriation). 
252 S.D. Myers v. Canada, Second Partial Award (Damages), ¶ 300 (Oct. 21, 2002), http:// 
www.appletonlaw.com/cases/Myers_Second%20Partial%20Award%20-%20Oct21-02.pdf (loss 
of profits and opportunity costs). 
253 Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, 41 I.L.M. 1347, 1361, ¶¶ 84–85 (2002) (losses relat-
ing to management time and the need to shut down the facility for a week to comply with 
Canada’s unreasonable audit requests). 
254 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, art. 10.26.6. 
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tion Rules is subject to limited review, to annulment on one or more of 
the following grounds: 
(a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted; 
(b) that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers; 
(c) that there was corruption on the part of a member of the 
Tribunal; 
(d) that there has been a serious departure from a funda-
mental rule of procedure; or 
(e) that the award has failed to state the reasons on which it 
is based.255 
An ad hoc committee of three is appointed from a panel of arbitrators, 
with the authority to annul the entire award or any part of it. If the 
committee annuls the award, either party to the arbitration may re-
quest that the dispute be submitted to a new tribunal. 
 The ICSID Annulment Committee procedures are not available 
for arbitral awards under either the UNCITRAL Rules or the ICSID 
Additional Facility Rules. In either instance, a court proceeding may 
be brought to set aside or annul the award in the state that has been 
designated as the situs of the arbitration.256 This has occurred several 
times in the NAFTA context, three times by Canadian federal or pro-
vincial courts and once by a federal court in the District of Columbia, 
with the award sustained in all instances.257 The criteria for review by 
the ICSID annulment committee are also relatively narrow, they re-
quire that: (1) the tribunal was not properly constituted; (2) the tri-
bunal “manifestly exceeded its powers;” (3) there was corruption on 
the part of a member of the tribunal; (4) there was a “serious depar-
                                                                                                                      
255 ICSID Convention, supra note 78, art. 52 (emphasis added). 
256 See NAFTA, supra note 30, art. 1136.3. 
257 See generally Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, Civil Action 
06-00748 (HHK), D.C.D.C. Feb. 14, 2007, available at http://www.ded.uscourts.gov/opin- 
ions/2007/2006CV00748-105959-2152007a.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2007); Feldman v. 
Mexico ( Judgement Dismissing Appeal), ( Jan. 11, 2005), available at http://nafta-claims. 
com/Disputes/Mexico/Feldman/FeldmanJudgmentDissmissingAppealReAnnul.pdf; S.D. 
Myers v. United Mexican States ( Judgement), ( Jan. 13, 2004), http://www.international. 
gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/ReasonsforOrder.pdf; Metalclad v. Mexico (Final Award), (Sept. 
2, 2000), available at http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Mexico/Metalclad/MetalcladFinal 
Award.pdf. See also David A. Gantz, An Appellate Mechanism for Review of Arbitral Decisions in 
Investor-State Disputes: Prospects and Challenges, 39 Vand J. Transnat’l L. 39, 51–54 (2006) 
(reviewing these cases) [hereinafter Gantz, Appellate Mechanism]. 
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ture from a fundamental rule of procedure; or (5) the award failed to 
state the reasons upon which it was based.258 
 Neither ICSID Annulment Committee nor national court review 
have been considered a fully satisfactory means of dealing with arbi-
tral awards. Under such circumstances, the idea of a single appellate 
mechanism,259 perhaps modeled after the WTO’s Appellate Body, has 
received support from diverse sources. NGOs and some government 
agencies have been concerned about the lack of appeals, a situation 
that means ad hoc arbitrators cannot be controlled and any legal er-
rors that are made cannot be effectively corrected for the current or 
for future cases. The use of the NAFTA Commission’s power to issue 
binding Interpretations (noted above), suffers from the uncertainties 
noted earlier, which may carry over to the CAFTA-DR Commission. In 
addition, arbitral decisions, even though not serving as precedent, are 
likely to be considered by subsequent tribunals. As a result, the Presi-
dent’s Trade Promotion Authority states: 
[T]he principal negotiating objectives of the United States 
regarding foreign investment are . . . to secure for investors 
important rights comparable to those that would be available 
under United States legal principles and practice, by . . . 
providing for an appellate body or similar mechanism to 
provide coherence to the interpretations of trade agree-
ments . . . .260 
(U.S. concerns are not shared by ICSID. In 2004, the secretariat pro-
posed the creation of an appellate mechanism, but the proposal was 
later withdrawn.)261 
 Relatively weak language in the Singapore and Chile FTAs, and in 
later FTAs with Peru and Colombia,262 on this subject was replaced in 
                                                                                                                      
258 ICSID Convention, supra note 78, art. 52(1). This contrasts with the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 1985, Article 34(2)(b), which also 
includes public policy and arbitrability grounds for negating an award. See http://www.un- 
citral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration.html (last visited 
May 5, 2007) (emphasis added). 
259 See Gantz, Appellate Mechanism, supra note 257, at 54–57. 
260 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3)(G)(iv) (2002). 
261 See ISCID Discussion Paper, Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitra-
tion, Annex, Possible Features of an ICSID Appeals Facility, Oct. 22, 2004, available at http:// 
www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/improve-arb.pdf (proposals were effectively with-
drawn as “premature”); ICSID Secretariat Working Paper, Suggested Changes to the ICSID 
Rules and Regulations, May 12, 2005, ¶ 4, available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/high- 
lights/052405-sgmanual.pdf (last visited May 5, 2007). 
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CAFTA-DR with a much more explicit (and likely less realistic) directive 
that requires the Parties, within three months of the entry into force of 
CAFTA-DR, to set up a negotiating group “to develop an appellate body 
or similar mechanism to review awards rendered by tribunals under this 
Chapter.”263 The negotiating group is to provide the Commission with a 
draft within one year of its establishment.264 The issues to be consid-
ered are enumerated, and include: (1) the composition; scope and 
standard of review; (2) transparency; (3) effect of decisions; (4) rela-
tionship to applicable arbitral rules; and (5) relationship to existing 
domestic and international laws on enforcement of arbitral awards.265 
 Whether the negotiating group will be able to agree upon a pro-
posal is at this writing an open question, as the legal and procedural 
challenges to creating a satisfactory appellate mechanism are not to 
be dismissed lightly.266 However, if successful, and if the mechanism is 
approved by the CAFTA-DR Parties, it might provide a greater level of 
certainty and predictability to arbitral awards under Chapter 10. 
IV. Government-to-Government Disputes Under Chapter 20 
A. NAFTA Antecedents of CAFTA-DR Dispute Settlement 
 The CAFTA-DR dispute settlement mechanism follows NAFTA 
Chapter 20 with some modifications; NAFTA in turn closely follows 
Chapter 18 of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (CFTA). Given 
the inclusion of a provision in the 1947 GATT recognizing the need 
for a means to resolve disputes over the interpretation and applica-
tion of trade agreements,267 and nearly forty years of third party dis-
pute resolution under GATT and the WTO at the time of the CFTA 
negotiations, the issue in the NAFTA negotiations, and in later FTAs, 
was less whether there should be such a mechanism as to how it 
should be structured. 
                                                                                                                      
262 “Within three years after the date of entry into force of the Agreement, the Parties 
shall consider whether to establish a bilateral appellate body or similar mechanism to re-
view awards rendered under Article 10.25 in arbitrations commenced after they establish 
the appellate body or similar mechanism,” Chile FTA, supra note 6, Annex 10-H; see also, 
e.g., Peru FTA, supra note 8, Annex 10-D. 
263 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 10, Annex 10-F, ¶ 1. 
264 Id. Annex 10-F, ¶ 2. 
265 Id. Annex 10-F, ¶ 1. 
266 Gantz, Appellate Mechanism, supra note 257, at 57–73. 
267 GATT, supra note 139, art. 23. 
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 In most such situations, panels of trade experts appointed on an 
ad hoc basis opine on the legal aspects of disputes between member 
governments, based on the “law” of the relevant international agree-
ments (NAFTA or GATT and other WTO agreements), in a typical 
international arbitral procedure consisting of consultations, briefings, 
a hearing, and the issuance of an opinion or report. A draft of what is 
now the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)268 existed 
at the time of the NAFTA negotiations.269 While the NAFTA negotia-
tors were aware of the DSU draft, there appears to have been rela-
tively little “borrowing” from the DSU in NAFTA, Chapter 20, perhaps 
in part because of the desire of both Canada and the United States to 
avoid wholesale renegotiation of CFTA, Chapter 18.270 CAFTA-DR, in 
contrast, appears to reflect somewhat more significantly some of the 
provisions and practices under the DSU (as well as under NAFTA), 
since at the time of the CAFTA-DR negotiations, the governments had 
eight years of experience under the DSU. 
 The CFTA general dispute settlement system was considered to 
offer “a significant improvement to the traditional, pre-WTO GATT 
proceedings” by making the formation of a panel mandatory at the 
request of either Party and for providing deadlines for each stage of 
the process, but the rulings, as in GATT, were only recommendations, 
leaving the prevailing Party the option of retaliation.271 The scope of 
Chapter 20 is broader that CFTA largely because NAFTA is broader 
than CFTA, covering, inter alia, such areas as intellectual property, 
standards, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and, to a limited de-
gree, the environment.272 CAFTA-DR jurisdiction is broader still, be-
cause disputes over compliance with labor and environmental obliga-
                                                                                                                      
268 DSU, supra note 44. 
269 Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, GATT Document MTN.TNC/W/FA, (Dec. 20, 1991), available at http:// 
www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92130093.pdf (last visited May 5, 2007) [here-
inafter Dunkel draft]. 
270 See NAFTA, supra note 30, art. 2019 (Chapter 20 of NAFTA took a similar approach 
to the DSU (art. 22.6) by providing a procedure to limit the level of sanctions imposed by 
the prevailing Party. Thus, Article 2019.3 makes available additional panel review if the 
retaliation level is considered “manifestly excessive.” This process, however, has never been 
invoked under NAFTA.). 
271 Jeffrey P. Bialos & Deborah E. Siegel, Dispute Resolution Under the NAFTA: The Newer 
and Improved Model, in The North American Free Trade Agreement: A New Frontier 
in International Trade and Investment in the Americas, supra note 66, at 323; CFTA, 
supra note 65, art. 1807. 
272 See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 30, art. 104 (environmental agreements), ch. 7B (sani-
tary and phytosanitary measures), ch. 9 (standards), ch. 14 (financial services), ch. 17 
(intellectual property). 
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tions are subject to Chapter 20, rather than to dispute resolution in 
separate “side” agreements. 
 The most recent NAFTA Chapter 20 panel decision was rendered 
in February 2001,273 six years ago and several years before the CAFTA-
DR negotiations. There have been only three regular Chapter 20 panel 
decisions and one non-NAFTA proceeding using Chapter 20 rules.274 
The jurisprudence is thus quite limited compared to the wealth of 
NAFTA investment dispute tribunal decisions,275 but is worth mention-
ing to provide a flavor of the types of disputes for which the mechanism 
has been utilized.276 
 In the first, the United States charged that NAFTA required Can-
ada to eliminate duties on certain dairy products (Dairy Products). Un-
der the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Canada had agreed to “tarifi-
cation” of dairy products (conversion of quantitative restraints to tar-
iffs), but there is no obligation under the WTO to eliminate tariffs. 
Under NAFTA, in contrast, all tariffs must be eliminated within no 
more than fifteen years. Canada took the position that these items were 
exempt from the NAFTA tariff reductions; the United States disagreed. 
Although NAFTA does not specify the use of a neutral country fifth ar-
bitrator, a panel consisting of two Canadian and two U.S. law professors 
                                                                                                                      
273 In re Cross-Border Trucking Servs. (Mex. v. U.S.), Secretariat File No. USA-MEX-98-
2008-01 (NAFTA Arbitration Feb. 6, 2001), http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/app/DocRe- 
pository/1/Dispute/english/NAFTA_Chapter_20/USA/ub98010e.pdf. 
274 The Softwood Lumber Agreement, May 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1195, 1200–1 (1996) 
sought (unsuccessfully in retrospect) to resolve a long-running dispute between Canada 
and the United States over Canada lumber exports to the United States, and contained an 
ad hoc dispute settlement mechanism that is based in part on NAFTA Chapter 20 (Art. V). 
An arbitral panel was convened in November 1998 to address an alleged violation of the 
agreement as a result of British Columbia’s reduction of certain charges for harvesting 
timber from government-owned lands, “In the Matter of British Columbia’s June 1, 1998 
Stumpage Reduction.” The panel, operating generally under the NAFTA Chapter 20 Rules 
of Procedure, reviewed briefs submitted by the Parties, held a hearing and drafted a deci-
sion, but the case was settled by the Parties one day before the decision was due. 
See Exchange of Diplomatic Notes, Aug. 26, 1999, available at http://canada.usembassy. 
gov/content/can_usa/lumbamen.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2007). 
275 Also, there have been more than 100 actions filed under the procedures set out in 
NAFTA, Chapter 19 (not replicated in CAFTA-DR or any subsequent U.S., Mexican or 
Canadian FTA). See NAFTA Secretariat, Status Report: NAFTA & FTA Dispute Set-
tlement Proceedings (2006), http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.aspx? 
DetailID=9. 
276 See generally Sidney J. Picker, NAFTA Chapter 20–Reflections on Party-to-Party Dispute 
Resolution, 14 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 465 (1997); David A. Gantz, Government-to-Gov- 
ernment Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA’s Chapter 20: A Commentary on the Process, 11 Am. Rev. 
Int’l Arb. 481 (2000) (more detailed discussions of the Chapter 20 process from the 
point of view of a panelist). 
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was chosen, with a British law professor as chairperson. The panel ulti-
mately determined unanimously that Canada’s actions were consistent 
with NAFTA.277 
 In Broom Corn Brooms, Mexico challenged the U.S. application of 
safeguards to corn brooms from Mexico. Mexico argued that the appli-
cation of the safeguards was inconsistent with NAFTA, Chapter 8 and 
with the WTO Agreement on Safeguards. The panel, chaired by an 
Australian government official, found unanimously in favor of Mexico, 
holding that the U.S. International Trade Commission had violated 
NAFTA by failing to explain adequately its “domestic industry” deter-
mination.278 
 Cross Border Trucking Services involved U.S. refusal to implement a 
NAFTA provision requiring the United States and Mexico, as of De-
cember 1995, to permit each other’s trucking firms to carry interna-
tional cargoes between the ten Mexican and four U.S. border states. 
Investment by Mexican firms in U.S. trucking companies had also been 
blocked. Mexico had charged that the United States had violated the 
national treatment and most-favored nation treatment provisions of 
Chapter 11 (investment) and Chapter 12 (cross-border services), as 
well as the specific provisions of Annex I imposing such obligations. 
The Panel ultimately unanimously agreed with Mexico, although in 
recognition of legitimate safety concerns in the United States, it held 
that “to the extent that the inspection and licensing requirements for 
Mexican truckers and drivers wishing to operate in the United States 
may not be ‘like’ those in place in the United States, different methods 
of ensuring compliance with the U.S. regulatory regime may be justifi-
able.”279 
 Insofar as the author has been able to determine,280 at least ten 
other matters have reached at least the consultation stage under Chap-
                                                                                                                      
277 In the Matter of Tariffs Applied by Canada to Certain U.S.-Origin Agricultural 
Products (U.S. v. Can.), NAFTA Secretariat No. CDA-95–2008–01 (Dec. 2, 1996), available 
at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/app/DocRepository/1/Dispute/english/NAFTA_Chap- 
ter_20/Canada/cb95010e.pdf 
278 U.S. Safeguard Action Taken on Broomcorn Brooms from Mexico, Case No. USA-
97–2008–01 ( Jan. 30, 1998), (citing NAFTA Annex 803.3(12)), available at http://www.naf- 
ta-sec-alena.org/app/DocRepository/1/Dispute/english/NAFTA_Chapter_20/USA/ub97 
010e.pdf. 
279 In re Cross-Border Trucking Servs. (Mex. v. U.S.), Secretariat File No. USA-MEX-98-
2008-01 (NAFTA Arbitration Feb. 6, 2001), ¶ 301, http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/app/ 
DocRepository/1/Dispute/english/NAFTA_Chapter_20/USA/ub98010e.pdf; see also id. 
¶¶ 295–300, 302. 
280 There remains a possibility that other formal requests for consultations were 
lodged at one time or another, without ever becoming public. 
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ter 20.281 Some of these were resolved through consultations, although 
most of the details are unknown, suggesting that with NAFTA, Chapter 
20, as with most formal dispute settlement mechanisms, success cannot 
be measured solely by the number of cases that went to term. 
 The NAFTA impact on CAFTA-DR Chapter 20 necessarily reflects 
some apparent unhappiness on the part of the United States with 
NAFTA’s Chapter 20.282 The U.S. government had not been fully satis-
fied with the results under CFTA, Chapter 18; several of the five cases 
decided under those proceedings were thought to be poorly reasoned 
decisions, and there was no reason to believe that Chapter 20 would 
work better. Thus, even from the outset, there was healthy skepticism 
of the process on the part of U.S. officials.283 Perhaps more signifi-
cantly, some issues, such as those involving dumping and illegal subsi-
dies, effectively require resolution by the WTO’s DSB because they are 
                                                                                                                      
281 These are: (a) Uranium Exports (United States v. Canada, 1994); (b) Import Re-
strictions on Sugar (Canada v. United States, 1995); (c) Restrictions on Small Package 
Delivery (United States v. Mexico, 1995); (d) Restrictions on Tomato Imports (Mexico v. 
United States, 1996); (e) Helms-Burton Act (Mexico and Canada v. United States, 1996), 
(f) Restrictions on Sugar (Mexico v. United States, 1998); (g) Farm Products Blockade 
(Canada v. United States, 1998); (h) Bus Service (Mexico v. United States, 1998); (i) Sport 
fishing Laws (United States v. Mexico, 1999); and ( j) Restrictions on Potatoes (Canada v. 
United States, 2001). See David A. Gantz, Government-to-Government Dispute Resolution Under 
NAFTA’s Chapter 20: A Commentary on the Process, 11 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 481, 456–549 
(2002) (discussing these articles) [hereinafter Gantz, Chapter 20]. 
282 U.S. reluctance to use Chapter 20 is well illustrated by the Mexican Sugar case con-
cerning U.S. market access to Mexican sugar under a NAFTA Side Letter, which Mexico 
considers directly related to a dispute over Mexican taxes imposed on beverages using 
high fructose corn syrup instead of sugar that are sold in Mexico. The Chapter 20 case 
technically remains pending, but U.S. authorities have refused for more than four years to 
appoint panelists, a refusal that was effectively supported by a WTO panel. Mexico-Tax 
Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS308/AB/R, 
adopted Mar. 24, 2006, available at http://www.wto.org. The Appellate Body upheld a 
panel decision rejecting Mexico’s request that the panel and appellate body decline to 
exercise WTO jurisdiction because the matter was “inextricably linked to a broader dis-
pute” which only a NAFTA [Chapter 20] panel could properly decide. The Appellate Body 
concluded that once it was established that a WTO panel had jurisdiction, it could not 
refuse to exercise it. See id. ¶¶ 10, 40, 57. That case has apparently been resolved by the 
United States and Mexico, but not through the Chapter 20 mechanisms. See Daniel Pruzin, 
U.S., Mexico Reach Agreement on WTO Soft Drink Dispute Compliance Deadline, 23 Int’l Trade 
Rep. (BNA) 1069 (2006) (discussing a settlement in which Mexico will implement a WTO 
decision holding that an excise tax on corn syrup violates WTO rules); USTR Announces 
Sugar Quota Allocations; Producers Cite ‘Disorder’ in Import Increase, 23 Int’l Trade Rep. 
(BNA) 1191 (2006) (indicating that Mexico’s sugar quotas for 2006 and 2007 have been 
increased). 
283 Discussion with a former U.S. government official involved in both CAFTA Chapter 
18 and NAFTA Chapter 20 negotiations. Memorandum of Conversation (May 31, 2005) 
(on file with author). 
2007] Settlement of Disputes Under CAFTA-DR 391 
excluded from NAFTA jurisdiction,284 or because the NAFTA Parties 
preferred to take their frequent disputes over “unfair” trade actions to 
Geneva. Those who expect adjudicatory systems to follow set time lim-
its and strict procedural rules are likely to find the NAFTA Chapter 20 
system wanting, in part because of the inherent difficulty in forming 
panels where there is no independent secretariat—in either NAFTA 
or CAFTA-DR—to assure that deadlines are met.285 Presumably, there 
is hope on the part of the U.S. negotiators that adaptation of some of 
the WTO’s post-decision procedures, discussed below, will improve 
the operation of the CAFTA-DR mechanism compared to that of 
NAFTA. 
 The CAFTA-DR mechanism thus begins its existence under 
something of a cloud reflecting U.S. dissatisfaction with the operation 
of NAFTA, Chapter 20. Nevertheless, it can be hoped that all of the 
CAFTA-DR governments realize that such a mechanism in CAFTA-DR 
is necessary, even if they do not necessarily have full confidence in its 
viability. 
B. The Chapter 20 Mechanism 
1. Functions of the Free Trade Commission 
 In CAFTA-DR, unlike NAFTA, the Free Trade Commission is 
treated under a separate Chapter 19, rather than in the dispute settle-
ment Chapter 20. The Free Trade Commission is comprised of cabinet 
level representatives or their delegates, like NAFTA, and the Agreement 
specifies the responsible ministries and officials for each country. These 
are the ministries of economy (El Salvador, Guatemala), industry and 
commerce (Dominican Republic, Honduras), development, industry 
and commerce (Nicaragua) and foreign commerce (Costa Rica).286 For 
the United States, the commissioner is the USTR.287 The same agen-
cies, but at the director general (or Assistant USTR) level, are also des-
ignated the “free trade coordinators.”288 The Commission’s responsi-
bilities go well beyond dispute settlement, and include: (1) supervision 
                                                                                                                      
284 NAFTA, supra note 30, art. 1901.3 (providing that “[N]o provision of any other 
Chapter of this Agreement shall be construed as imposing obligations on a Party with re-
spect to the Party’s antidumping law or countervailing duty law.”). 
285 This is in contrast to the WTO’s DSB, where the secretariat in most cases has been 
able to keep the panel selection process moving forward promptly. 
286 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 19, art. 19.1.1, Annex 19.1. 
287 Id. ch. 19, Annex 19.1(g). 
288 Id. ch. 19, art. 19.2, Annex 19.2. 
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of implementation of the Agreement; (2) overseeing the “further 
elaboration” of the Agreement (e.g., establishing a negotiating group 
under Annex 10-F to consider a mechanism for review of arbitral deci-
sions in investor-state disputes); (3) resolution of disputes over the in-
terpretations of the Agreement; (4) supervision of committees and 
working groups; and (5) other matters that may affect the operation of 
the Agreement.289 
 The Commission is also authorized to “establish and delegate re-
sponsibilities to committees and working groups;” modify tariff sched-
ules, rules of origin, and interpretative guidelines for the customs and 
rules of origin chapters; modify annexes for the government procure-
ment chapter; issue interpretations of Agreement provisions; seek ad-
vice of non-governmental persons or groups; and take other actions 
agreed upon.290 Most significantly, for this discussion, the Commission 
is empowered with administrative coordination of the Chapter 20 dis-
pute settlement mechanism, and each Party is required to designate an 
office to provide administrative assistance, to be responsible for the op-
eration and costs of the office, and to provide fees and expenses for 
panelists and experts in the Chapter 20 process.291 These latter func-
tions have been exercised by national sections of the NAFTA Secre-
tariat,292 and one may reasonably assume that the CAFTA-DR process 
will operate in the same manner, albeit without the actual creation of a 
CAFTA-DR secretariat. 
2. The Dispute Settlement Process 
 As in NAFTA, the CAFTA-DR parties are encouraged to “endeavor 
to agree on the interpretation and application of this Agreement,” and 
to cooperate and consult on matters affecting its operation.293 The ba-
sic applicability of the dispute settlement provisions is the same as in 
NAFTA,294 but in CAFTA, it is outlined in greater detail: 
(a) with respect to the avoidance or settlement of all disputes 
between the Parties regarding the interpretation or applica-
tion of this Agreement; 
                                                                                                                      
289 Id. ch. 19, art. 19.1.2. 
290 Id. ch. 19, art. 19.1.3. 
291 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 19, art. 19.3. 
292 See NAFTA, supra note 30, art. 2002. 
293 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 20, art. 20.1; NAFTA, supra note 30, art. 2003. 
294 See NAFTA, supra note 30, art. 2004. 
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(b) wherever a Party considers that an actual or proposed 
measure of another Party is or would be inconsistent with the 
obligations of this Agreement or that another Party has oth-
erwise failed to carry out its obligations under this Agree-
ment; and 
(c) wherever a Party considers that an actual or proposed 
measure of another Party causes or would cause nullification or 
impairment in the sense of Annex 20.2.295 
“Nullification or impairment” is defined along the lines of GATT, in 
terms of actions by a Party which are not violations of the Agreement, 
but nevertheless “nullify or impair” “any benefit it [the other Party] 
could reasonably have expected to accrue to it” under the provisions of 
chapters relating to: (1) national treatment, market access, rules of ori-
gin and customs administration/trade facilitation; (2) technical barri-
ers to trade; (3) government procurement; (4) cross-border services 
trade; or (5) intellectual property rights.296 
 A Party seeking dispute settlement must normally make an elec-
tion among Chapter 20, another free trade agreement to which the 
disputing Parties are Party (for example, a Free Trade Area of the 
Americas agreement if one is ever negotiated), and the WTO’s DSB. 
Once a forum has been chosen, “the forum selected shall be used to 
the exclusion of the others,” but certain disputes—such as those relat-
ing to unfair trade practices and to application of sanitary and phyto-
sanitary provisions—may be submitted only to WTO dispute settle-
ment, not to CAFTA-DR Chapter 20. 297 NAFTA contains substantively 
similar language, while requiring that certain matters relating to envi-
ronmental, standards or sanitary and phytosanitary issues be exclu-
sively resolved under NAFTA, Chapter 20.298 Conflicts over choice of 
forum have arisen at least once under NAFTA, when Mexico re-
quested a WTO panel to refrain from exercising jurisdiction over a 
dispute with the United States involving a tax on soft drinks made 
with high fructose corn syrup, on the grounds that the issues should 
be resolved in a NAFTA Chapter 20 proceeding initiated by Mexico 
(the latter focusing on Mexico’s access to the U.S. sugar market). 
                                                                                                                      
295 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 20, art. 20.2. 
296 Id. ch. 20, Annex 20.2. 
297 Id. ch. 20 art. 20.3 (choice of forum generally); see also id. ch. 8, art. 8.8 (excluding 
dumping and countervailing duty matters) and ch. 6, art. 6.2.2 (excluding sanitary and 
phytosanitary disputes). 
298 See NAFTA, supra note 30, art. 2005. 
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However, the WTO panel and appellate body held that they had no 
authority to decline to exercise jurisdiction.299 
 As in many international arbitration regimes, and in the NAFTA 
and WTO DSB,300 the process in CAFTA-DR begins with a written re-
quest for consultations, with copies sent to the other Parties to the 
Agreement.301 The reasons, the legal basis for the complaint, and the 
“actual or proposed measure or other matter at issue” must all be 
identified. Another Party may participate in the consultations upon 
request within seven days of notice (five days for perishable goods).302 
Should consultations be unsuccessful in resolving the dispute within 
sixty days of the request (fifteen days for perishable goods), any con-
sulting party may request the Commission to exercise good offices, 
consultation, and mediation.303 A similar request may be lodged when 
consultations have been held under the labor, environment, or stan-
dards provisions of the Agreement.304 The Commission is directed to 
meet within ten days of the request and “shall endeavor to resolve the 
dispute promptly.” At its discretion, the Commission may call techni-
cal advisors, have recourse to other good offices, conciliation or me-
diation procedures, or make recommendations, all with the objective 
of assisting “the consulting Parties to reach a mutually satisfactory 
resolution of the dispute.”305 Multiple proceedings regarding the 
same measure are to be consolidated.306 
 Should the matter be unresolved within thirty to seventy-five days 
after the request to the Commission (depending on whether the mat-
ter has been consolidated or involved perishable goods, or whether 
the Commission has actually convened), any of the consulting Parties 
that requested the Commission to meet “may request in writing the 
establishment of an arbitral panel to consider the matter.”307 Here, as 
in NAFTA,308 the requests for consultations and a meeting of the 
Commission are conditions precedent for the request for convening 
of an arbitral panel. This means that other than for perishable goods, 
                                                                                                                      
299 Mexico-Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, supra note 281, ¶¶ 44–
57. 
300 NAFTA, supra note 30, art. 2006; DSU, supra note 44, art. 4. 
301 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 20, art. 20.4.2. 
302 Id. ch. 20, art.20.4.3. 
303 Id. ch. 20, art. 20.5.1. 
304 Id. ch. 20, art. 20.5.2. 
305 Id. ch. 20, art. 20.5.4. 
306 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 20, art. 20.5.5. 
307 Id. ch. 20, art. 20.6.1. 
308 See NAFTA, supra note 30, arts. 2006–2008. 
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it will be at least ninety days between the request for consultations and 
the request for establishment of a panel (sixty days at the consultation 
stage and at least thirty days at the conciliation stage). In the WTO’s 
DSB, consultations are mandatory, but conciliation is not; a complain-
ing Member may request the formation of a panel sixty days after the 
request for consultations if the matter has not been resolved by con-
sultations. The panel request, however, may be blocked (until the 
next DSB meeting) by any Member at the first monthly DSB meeting 
at which the request is lodged, meaning that in the WTO system it 
normally takes ninety days from request for consultation to the DSB’s 
order to form an arbitral panel.309 
 As in NAFTA and in the WTO, CAFTA-DR provides for the estab-
lishment of a standing roster of persons to serve as panelists, within 
six months after the Agreement enters into force. 310 NAFTA required 
the establishment, by January 1, 1994, of a roster of up to thirty per-
sons,311 but the NAFTA Parties have been unable to agree on such a 
formal roster, thirteen years after NAFTA entered into force. Rather, 
under NAFTA Chapter 20, panelists have been selected on an ad hoc 
basis (with a complaining Party selecting two nationals of the other 
Party, and vice versa—a practice abandoned in CAFTA-DR) and the 
chairperson of the five person panel being selected by the disputing 
Parties from non-NAFTA citizen experts. This has occurred despite 
language that indicates that in the absence of agreement between the 
disputing Parties on a chair, the chairperson should be selected by a 
disputing Party chosen by lot, with the only restriction that the chair 
not be a national of that disputing Party.312 With CAFTA-DR, as in 
NAFTA, panelists must have “expertise or experience in law, interna-
tional trade, other matters covered by this Agreement, or the resolu-
tion of disputes arising under international trade agreements . . . .”313 
They are to be chosen “on the basis of objectivity, reliability, and 
                                                                                                                      
309 DSU, supra note 44, arts. 4.7, 6.1. 
310 This likely means six months after the Agreement enters into force for the last of 
the seven Parties. 
311 NAFTA, supra note 30, art. 2009. 
312 Id. art. 2011. For example, in Cross-Border Trucking Services, the two U.S. panelists 
were selected by Mexico, the two Mexican Panelists by the United States, and the chair—a 
British barrister—by the two governments, in a process that required 15 months. See In re 
Cross-Border Trucking Servs. (Mex. v. U.S.), Secretariat File No. USA-MEX-98-2008-01 
(NAFTA Arbitration Feb. 6, 2001), ¶¶ 21–24, http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/app/DocRe- 
pository/1/Dispute/english/NAFTA_Chapter_20/USA/ub98010e.pdf (relating the pro-
ceedings from the request for a panel on September 22, 1998 to its ultimate formation 
February 2, 2000). 
313 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 20, art. 20.7.2(a). 
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sound judgment” and be independent of the government; they must 
comply with a code of conduct established by the Commission.314 
 In a significant departure from the NAFTA text, where at least 
four of the five panelists in a given case are citizens of the disputing 
Parties,315 CAFTA-DR provides that unless otherwise agreed, of the 
seventy individuals selected to be roster members, up to eight will be 
from each Party, and up to fourteen of the seventy will be persons who 
are not nationals of any Party. All are to be appointed by consensus, 
for a minimum of three years.316 In part, this change likely reflects the 
actual practice under NAFTA, where in each of the three cases the 
chairperson was a national of a country other than the disputing Par-
ties. 
 The process for selecting panelists in individual disputes in 
CAFTA-DR is similar to that in NAFTA, with the important explicit pro-
viso that if there is not agreement on a chair within fifteen days of the 
request for establishment of the panel, the chair is to be chosen by lot 
among the (fourteen) roster members that are non-nationals of a dis-
puting Party.317 Each party is to select its own panelist, “normally” from 
the roster, with any person selected other than from the roster subject 
(as in NAFTA318) to a peremptory challenge by the other Party, 319 
again putting a premium on selection from the roster. If either Party 
has failed to designate a panelist within fifteen days after selection of 
the chair, that panelist is selected by lot from the (eight) nationals of 
that Party on the roster.320 It can thus be hoped that the CAFTA-DR 
parties will agree promptly on a group of panelists, even if the initial 
agreed group is much fewer than seventy persons. 
 Whether this panel selection process will work better than that 
under Chapter 20 remains to be seen. Consensus among seven gov-
ernments on seventy panelists may be difficult to achieve; consensus 
among the three governments on thirty NAFTA panelists has re-
mained elusive. Without a permanent roster, the rest of the panel se-
                                                                                                                      
314 Id. at art. 20.7.2 (b)–(d). When the dispute involves financial services issues, a sepa-
rate roster of persons with experience in financial services law or practice is used to the 
exclusion of the Chapter 20 roster. Id. ch. 12, art. 12.18. There have been no such disputes 
under NAFTA. 
315 See NAFTA, supra note 30, art. 2011.1 (where each disputing Party chooses two na-
tionals of the other disputing Party to serve). 
316 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 20, art. 20.7.1. 
317 Id. ch. 20, art. 20.9.1(b). 
318 See NAFTA, supra note 30, art. 2011.3. 
319 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 20, arts. 20.9.1(c), 20.9.2. 
320 Id. ch. 20, arts. 20.9.1(c), 20.9.1(d). 
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lection process will likely break down, causing significant delays as the 
disputing Parties argue about panel selection, and delays along the 
lines of those found under NAFTA—six to sixteen months or 
longer—are likely to occur.321 
 The Commission is to establish rules of procedure for the opera-
tion of the panels, which will presumably be quite similar to the 
NAFTA Chapter 20 Rules of Procedure.322 Under NAFTA, as under 
CAFTA-DR, there must be at least one hearing.323 However, the re-
maining rules depart significantly from NAFTA provisions. There is 
no provision for transparency in NAFTA, and thus all submissions 
were confidential. In Dairy Products, there was even a short-lived effort 
to keep the names of the panelists (other than the chairperson) con-
fidential!324 The hearings in the most recent NAFTA, Chapter 20 case, 
Cross Border Trucking Services, held in May 2000, were not public.325 
 Nor were the transparency measures dictated by the NAFTA 
Commission with regard to Chapter 11 investor-state disputes (dis-
cussed in Part IV, above) extended to proceedings under NAFTA, 
Chapter 20, although discussions among the NAFTA Parties to this 
end have apparently been taking place for some time.326 This may well 
reflect the lack of any general rule of transparency for government-to-
government disputes in the WTO, and it is highly unlikely that most 
of the WTO Members would support open hearings and prompt dis-
closure of briefs. Notwithstanding that general view, several key WTO 
Members, the United States, Canada, and the European Union, have 
authorized the panel to make ad hoc arrangements to open hearings 
to the public via closed circuit television for hearings affecting those 
parties (but not for other WTO Members who appeared in the matter 
as third parties).327 
                                                                                                                      
321 See Gantz, Chapter 20, supra note 281, at 502–04 (discussing reasons for delay in 
panel selection under NAFTA Chapter 20). 
322 NAFTA, Model Rules of Procedure for Chapter 20 (1994), available at http://www. 
nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.aspx?CategoryId=74 (last visited May 5, 2007). 
323 See NAFTA, supra note 30, art. 2012. 
324 See NAFTA Chapter 20 Panel Selected in Farm Tariff Flap with Canada, 13 Int’l Trade 
Rep. (BNA), vol. 13, no. 4 ( Jan. 24, 1996) (reporting the name of the chairperson by stat-
ing “A USTR spokeswoman confirmed that panelists have been selected but said that their 
names were not yet available.”). 
325 The author, as one of the panelists, was present. 
326 E-mail communication from Meg Kinnear, International Trade Canada, to the Au-
thor (Sept. 5, 2006) (on file with author). 
327 See WTO, Communication from the Chairman of the Panels, WT/DS380/8, 
WT/DS321/8 in United States—Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC-
Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320; Canada—Continued Suspension of Obligations in 
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 In CAFTA-DR, in contrast, the rule is transparency, and this is a 
significant innovation for government-to-government dispute resolu-
tion, which has tended to keep disputes under wraps at least until they 
are resolved. Although confidential information may be protected, 
the hearings must generally be open to the public; the Parties’ initial 
and rebuttal briefs are public except for confidential information; the 
panel is to consider requests from NGOs to provide their views 
(amicus curiae briefs) that “may assist the panel in evaluating the 
submissions and arguments of the disputing parties.”328 In addition, 
unlike NAFTA, where specific panelists are not to be associated with 
any minority or majority opinions,329 under CAFTA-DR, “panelists 
may furnish separate opinions on matters not unanimously 
agreed.”330 
 Other Parties to CAFTA-DR that are not parties to the particular 
dispute may, upon written request, fully participate in the proceedings 
through attendance at hearings and making and receiving written and 
oral submissions, with those submissions “reflected in the final report 
of the panel.”331 Substantially identical language appears in NAFTA 
and the NAFTA Party that is not a disputing Party has routinely par-
ticipated in Chapter 20 proceedings.332 Similarly, the NAFTA lan-
guage permits either a disputing Party or the panel on its own initia-
tive, “to seek information and technical advice from any person or 
body that it deems appropriate” subject to agreement on terms and 
conditions by the Parties.333 However, NAFTA language providing for 
the use of a scientific review board for environmental or other scien-
tific issues334 does not appear in CAFTA-DR. Separate opinions are 
permitted when the panel is not unanimous.335 
                                                                                                                      
the EC-Hormone Dispute, WT/DS32 (2005), available at http://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/ ispu_e/ds320–21–8_e.pdf (advising the Chairman of the DSB of the procedures 
to be followed). 
328 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 20, art. 20.10.1. 
329 NAFTA, supra note 30, art. 2017.2. 
330 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 20, art. 20.13.5. 
331 Id. ch. 20, art. 20.11. 
332 NAFTA, supra note 30, art. 2013. See, e.g., In re Cross-Border Trucking Servs. (Mex. 
v. U.S.), Secretariat File No. USA-MEX-98-2008-01 (NAFTA Arbitration Feb. 6, 2001), ¶¶ 
27, 29, http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/app/DocRepository/1/Dispute/english/NAFTA_ 
Chapter_20/USA/ub98010e.pdf (noting “Canada filed its third party submission on Feb-
ruary 22, 2000,” and a representative also attended the hearing). 
333 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 20, art. 20.12; NAFTA, supra note 30, art. 2014. 
334 See NAFTA, supra note 30, art. 2015. 
335 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 20, art. 20.13.5. 
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 CAFTA-DR, like NAFTA, contains time limits for the proceedings; 
in CAFTA-DR, the initial report of the panel is to be circulated to the 
Parties “within 120 days after the last panelist is selected or such other 
period as the Model Rules of Procedure . . . may provide.”336 This ini-
tial report is to contain findings of facts, the panel’s “determination as 
to whether a disputing Party has not conformed to its obligations un-
der this Agreement” or of nullification or impairment, along with rec-
ommendations if the Parties have so requested.337 The 120 day rule is 
not hard and fast; the panel may request more time, advising the Par-
ties of the reasons for the delay and an estimate of the additional time 
required, with the caveat that “in no case should the period to provide 
the report exceed 180 days.”338 
 While the initial period is 120 days, instead of the ninety days 
provided in NAFTA,339 it is still unlikely that the panels will be able to 
complete this step of their work in four months. The major delays will 
likely relate to the briefing schedule and scheduling of a hearing at a 
time that is convenient for several governments and three panelists. 
In Cross-Border Trucking Services, for example, the final panelist was se-
lected on February 2, 2000; the briefs were very promptly submitted 
by Mexico, the United States, and Canada on February 14, February 
23, April 3, and April 24; and the hearing was held on May 17, 
2000.340 Post-hearing submissions were solicited by the panel for sub-
mission June 1, later extended to June 9 by request of the Parties.341 
 Thus, the hearing in Cross-Border Trucking Services took place 106 
days after the last panelist was selected, and the case was not under 
submission until 128 days after panel selection. There were no un-
usual delays in the briefings or the hearing; the Parties and the panel-
ists all acted promptly in light of the complexities of the legal and fac-
tual issues. Yet the period of time for the case to be ripe for panel de-
cision was thirty-eight days in excess of the NAFTA time limit, and eight 
days in excess of the CAFTA-DR limit, suggesting that both may be 
impractical unless the Parties are willing to accept very short filing 
and response periods for their submissions. However, in most cases, it 
                                                                                                                      
336 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, at ch. 20, art. 20.13.1. 
337 Id. ch. 20, art. 20.13.3. 
338 Id. ch. 20, art. 20.13.4. 
339 See NAFTA, supra note 30, art. 2016.2. 
340 In re Cross-Border Trucking Servs. (Mex. v. U.S.), Secretariat File No. USA-MEX-98-
2008-01 (NAFTA Arbitration Feb. 6, 2001), ¶¶ 23–29, http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/ 
app/DocRepository/1/Dispute/english/NAFTA_Chapter_20/USA/ub98010e.pdf. 
341 Id. ¶ 30. 
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should be possible for the panelists to complete the interim report 
within 180 days; this will be easier under CAFTA-DR than under 
NAFTA, because there are only three panelists rather than five.342 
Strong administrative assistance by the national offices designated to 
provide administrative assistance to panels343 will facilitate panel com-
pliance with the deadlines; weak administrative assistance will make 
such compliance much less likely. 
 It is anticipated that the Parties will provide comments on the 
interim report to the panel within fourteen days of the presentation 
of the report, unless the Parties agree to another period,344 with the 
panel expected to render a final report sixteen days later.345 The 
thirty-day time limit is the same as in NAFTA.346 It seems unlikely that 
this time limit will be strictly met, although the Parties and panelists 
should be able to come reasonably close. Again based on the author’s 
personal experience, such comments are normally quite valuable to 
panels and are studied carefully by the panelists; even if the result it-
self does not change, the governments’ superior knowledge of details 
may help the panel avoid both factual and legal errors. 
3. Implementation of Decisions 
 Once the final report is provided to the Parties, “the disputing 
Parties shall agree on the resolution of the dispute, which normally 
shall conform with the determinations and recommendations, if any, 
of the panel.”347 Where the panel finds that a “disputing Party has not 
conformed with its obligation under this Agreement, or that a disput-
ing Party’s measure is causing nullification or impairment . . . the 
resolution, whenever possible, shall be to eliminate the non-conformity 
or the nullification or impairment.”348 In other words, if a panel finds 
                                                                                                                      
342 However, it is worth keeping in mind that the three panelists will be located in 
three different countries, likely in different time zones (particularly if the chairperson is 
not from the Western Hemisphere), and are likely to have day jobs. These factors signifi-
cantly complicate conference calls and post-hearing meetings of the panelists. (The panel-
ists are ad hoc; NAFTA panelists are paid at the rate of CDN$800 per day, currently about 
US$720 per day. One can reasonably assume that the CAFTA-DR Commission will set a 
similar rate, although presumably not in Canadian dollars.) Also, in most cases, it will 
probably be necessary for the panel to render its opinion in both English and Spanish, 
requiring additional time for translation. 
343 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 19, art. 19.3.1(a). 
344 Id. ch. 20, art. 20.13.6. 
345 Id. ch. 20, art. 20.14.1. 
346 See NAFTA, supra note 30, art. 2017.1. 
347 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 20, art. 20.15.1 (emphasis added). 
348 Id. ch. 20, art. 20.15.2 (emphasis added). 
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a violation, the violating Party is expected to correct it, but they have 
some flexibility to work things out if both can agree on a solution. 
 If, however, compliance satisfactory to the prevailing Party does 
not occur within forty-five days, the Parties are expected to enter into 
negotiations “with a view to developing mutually acceptable compen-
sation.”349 If the negotiations are not successful in an additional thirty 
days, or if compensation agreements are not complied with, the com-
plaining Party may retaliate through the usual (under the WTO and 
other trade agreements350) suspension of benefits, subject to notifica-
tion as to what the complaining Party believes are “benefits of equiva-
lent effect” to the protested measure.351 Where the losing Party be-
lieves that the suspension of benefits proposed is “manifestly exces-
sive,” it may request that the panel reconvene to consider the level of 
compensation.352 
 The opportunity to review the level of compensation demanded by 
the complaining Party at the outset is something of a departure from 
NAFTA, where the alleged excessiveness of the benefits could only be 
challenged after the fact.353 Under CAFTA-DR, it is contemplated that a 
challenge that the suspension is manifestly excessive is to be resolved by 
the panel before any suspension takes place, with the suspension of trade 
benefits then being in the amount determined by the panel, unless the 
panel fails to determine the proper level of suspension.354 This more 
closely resembles the parallel requirements in the DSU.355 However, 
unlike the DSU, where there have been several proceedings in which 
the losing Party objected to the magnitude of benefits to be sus-
pended,356 there is little relevant experience in NAFTA. In the first de-
                                                                                                                      
349 Id. ch. 20, art. 20.16.1. 
350 DSU, supra note 44, art. 22. 
351 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 20, art. 20.16.2. 
352 Id. ch. 20, art. 20.16.3. 
353 See NAFTA, supra note 30, arts. 2019.1–4 (providing for the complaining Part to 
suspend benefits after 30 days, and also for the establishment of a new panel to determine 
whether the suspension is manifestly excessive, with that panel to render a decision within 
60 days after the last panelist is chosen, or as otherwise agreed). 
354 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 20, arts. 20.16.3–4. 
355 See DSU, supra note 44, arts. 22.2, 22.6 (where the Member seeking to suspend 
benefits “may request authorization from the DSB to suspend the application to the Mem-
ber concerned of concessions under the covered agreements” and the losing Party may 
contest the requested suspension levels). 
356 See, e.g., Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities–Regime for the Im-
portation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/ARB (Apr. 9, 1999), available at 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/226awards/ec-bananas(226)(us).pdf; Decision by 
the Arbitrators, United States–Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, WT/DS136/ARB (Feb. 24, 
2004), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/226awards/us-1916act(226).pdf. 
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cision, Dairy, the panel found no violation of NAFTA by Canada, so no 
question of compliance arose.357 In Broom Corn Brooms, Mexico had al-
ready suspended certain concessions as was their right in a safeguards 
matter, and continued the suspension until the United States lifted the 
safeguards measures nine months later. In Cross-Border Trucking Services, 
there has been a long-standing disagreement between the United States 
and Mexico regarding implementation of the panel ruling, but no re-
quest for suspension of benefits, perhaps because of continued Mexi-
can trucking industry opposition to opening the border. A settlement 
appears to have been reached in late February 2007, but whether it will 
be implemented or blocked by U.S. Congressional opponents is un-
clear.358 
 A similar type of challenge is available under Article 20.16.3(b) to 
the respondent Party if the complaining Party considers that “it has 
eliminated the non-conformity or the nullification or impairment that 
the panel has found.”359 A “compliance review” is available under Ar-
ticle 20.18 after sanctions have actually been applied, providing that 
“if the Party complained against considers that it has eliminated the 
non-conformity or the nullification or impairment that the panel has 
found, it may refer the matter to the panel by providing written notice 
to the complaining Party or Parties.”360 If the panel agrees, the com-
plaining Party or Parties are required to “promptly reinstate any bene-
fits that Party has or those Parties have suspended . . . .”361 
 This review of compliance or non-compliance with the panel’s find-
ing of a violation resembles the WTO “Article 21.5” procedure,362 al-
though in most instances at the WTO it is the complaining Member, not 
the respondent Member, that asks the panel to determine that the al-
leged compliance was not in fact sufficient. The United States has been 
on both sides of this process in the WTO363 experience, which may have 
led, at least in part, to inclusion of this language in CAFTA-DR. 
                                                                                                                      
357 In the Matter of Tariffs Applied by Canada to Certain U.S.-Origin Agricultural Products 
(U.S. v. Canada), (Dec. 1996), NAFTA Secretariat No. CDA-95–2008–01, ¶ 209, available at 
http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/app/DocRepository/1/Dispute/english/NAFTA_Chapter_20/ 
Canada/cb95010e.pdf (last visited May 5, 2007). 
358 Robert Guy Matthews, U.S. to Allow Mexican Trucks, Wall St. J., Feb. 24, 2007, at A3. 
359 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 20, art. 20.16.3(b). 
360 Id. ch. 20, art. 20.18.1. 
361 Id. ch. 20, art. 20.18.2. 
362 See DSU, supra note 44, at 1238, art. 21.5 (permitting either disputant to challenge 
alleged compliance with a DSB ruling). 
363 See, e.g., Canada-Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk, W/D103, 113/ 
AB/RW2 (Oct. 13, 1999), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtoab/ 
canada-milk(ab).pdf; European Communities-Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-
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 As in NAFTA and the DSU,364 in CAFTA-DR suspension of bene-
fits is to be in the same sector as affected by the measure, unless this is 
“not practicable or effective.” In that instance, benefits may be sus-
pended in other sectors.365 
 A major innovation in CAFTA-DR is to provide the Parties with an 
alternative to suspension of benefits; the Party committing the violation 
may, by written notice to the complaining Party, agree to pay annual 
monetary damages, in U.S. dollars to the complaining Party, in lieu of 
suspension of trade benefits. If there is no agreement on the amount, it 
is set at fifty percent of the level of trade sanctions, as determined by 
the panel, or if there is no panel determination of amounts, by the 
complaining Party.366 The Commission may, however, determine, 
“when circumstances warrant,” that the assessment “be paid into a fund 
established by the Commission and expended at the direction of the 
Commission for appropriate initiatives to facilitate trade between the 
disputing Parties . . . .”367 It is not entirely clear how the sequencing 
would work in terms of proposed suspension of benefits, a panel de-
termination of the amount of benefits, a request for the alternative of a 
monetary assessment and a possible Commission decision (by consen-
sus) to use the funds for trade facilitation instead, but it is certainly an 
interesting departure from the traditional suspension of benefits ap-
proach. 
4. Special Rules for Labor and Environmental Disputes 
 Another major change results from Chapter 20 jurisdiction over 
possible violations of CAFTA-DR’s requirements for enforcement of 
national labor and environmental laws. Separate rosters of up to twenty-
eight persons each are to be designated for resolution of disputes aris-
ing under the labor and environmental chapters of CAFTA-DR, all per-
sons with experience in the respective areas, possessing “objectivity, re-
                                                                                                                      
Type Bed Linen from India (Mar. 1, 2001), WT/DS141/AB/RW, available at http://www. 
worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtoab/ec-bedlinen(ab).pdf; United States-Tax Treatment for 
"Foreign Sales Corporations," WT/DS108/AB/RW (Feb. 24, 2000), available at http:// 
www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtoab/us-fsc(ab).pdf (where allege compliance was chal-
lenged by complaining Member and others as insufficient). 
364 See NAFTA, supra note 30, art. 2019.2; DSU, supra note 44, art. 22.3. 
365 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 20, art. 20.16.5. 
366 Id. ch. 20, art. 20.16.6. 
367 Id. ch. 20, art. 20.16.7. 
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liability and sound judgment,” and acting independently of the gov-
ernments.368 
 Chapter 20 jurisdiction over labor and environmental issues is 
arguably narrower than other actions inconsistent with the Agree-
ment. For example, not every failure to enforce labor laws is grounds 
for initiating dispute settlement. Rather, the obligation is as follows: 
“A Party shall not fail to effectively enforce its labor laws, through a sus-
tained or recurring course of action or inaction, after the date of entry into 
force of this Agreement.”369 Similar language circumscribes actions 
under the environmental Chapter 17.370 
 Moreover, if a panel finds non-compliance with these labor or en-
vironmental obligations, there is no option of suspension of trade 
benefits. Rather, CAFTA-DR provides for an “annual monetary assess-
ment” to be determined by the panel, with the panel taking into ac-
count such factors as: (1) the trade effects of the non-enforcement; (2) 
its pervasiveness and duration; (3) the reasons for non-enforcement; 
(4) the level of enforcement “that could be reasonably expected of the 
Party given its resource constraints;” (5) efforts of the party to remedy 
non-enforcement; and (6) any other relevant factors.371 The monetary 
assessment is to be paid in U.S. dollars, but not to the complaining 
Party. Rather, the assessment amounts, which are limited to fifteen mil-
lion dollars annually:372 
[A]re to be paid into a fund established by the Commission 
and shall be expended at the direction of the Commission 
for appropriate labor or environmental initiatives, including 
efforts to improve or enhance labor or environmental law 
enforcement, as the case may be, in the territory of the Party 
complained against, consistent with its law.373 
 Insulating labor and environmental violations from trade sanctions 
is one of the more controversial aspects of CAFTA-DR, but one may 
reasonably assume that, as under the North American Agreement on 
Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) where there have been no arbi-
trations, cases involving these issues that reach Chapter 20 will be few, 
due to the relatively high threshold. Given the innovative nature of the 
                                                                                                                      
368 Id. ch. 16, art. 16.7 (labor), ch. 17, art. 17.11 (environment). 
369 Id. ch. 16, art. 16.2.1(a) (emphasis added). 
370 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 17, art. 17.2.1(a). 
371 Id. ch. 20, arts. 20.17.1–2. 
372 Adjusted for inflation beginning January 2006. Id. ch. 20, art. 20.17.2. 
373 Id. ch. 20, art. 20.17.4. 
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use of monetary assessments as an alternative to trade sanctions gener-
ally, and as the only remedy for non-compliance in labor and environ-
mental disputes, it is not surprising that there is a mechanism which 
provides for a review of the effectiveness of these provisions (Articles 
20.17 and 20.18) after five years, or after monetary assessments have 
been assessed in five proceedings, whichever comes first.374 This sug-
gests, in contrast, that the Parties during the negotiations believed that 
the innovative dispute settlement mechanism under Chapter 20, and 
the monetary penalty route, would be used on a regular basis. 
C. Domestic Proceedings and Private Commercial Disputes 
 The three articles in this final section of Chapter 20 reflect sev-
eral carry-over provisions from NAFTA. CAFTA-DR, like NAFTA, in-
corporates a mechanism, perhaps patterned loosely on the “prelimi-
nary rulings” jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice:375 
If an issue of interpretation or application of this Agreement 
arises in any domestic judicial or administrative proceeding 
of a Party that any Party considers would merit its interven-
tion, or if a court or administrative body solicits the views of 
a Party, that Party shall notify the other Parties. The Com-
mission shall endeavor to agree on an appropriate response 
as expeditiously as possible.376 
If the commission issues an “agreed interpretation,” that interpreta-
tion must be submitted by the Party in whose territory the court or 
tribunal is located to that court or tribunal, “in accordance with the 
rules of that forum.”377 However, if the Commission cannot agree, 
“any Party may submit its own views to the court or administrative 
body in accordance with the rules of that forum.”378 
                                                                                                                      
374 Id. ch. 20, art. 20.19. 
375 Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 234 
(as in effect 2002), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12002E/pdf/ 
12002E_EN.pdf (last visited May 5, 2007) (the European Court of Justice has jurisdiction 
to give preliminary rulings, inter alia, concerning “the interpretation of this treaty . . . .”; 
“When such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court 
or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to 
give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon.”). 
376 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 20, art. 20.20.1; NAFTA, supra note 30, art. 2020.1 
(with virtually identical language). 
377 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 20, art. 20.20.2. 
378 Id. ch. 20, art. 20.20.3. 
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 This mechanism, although never used under NAFTA, could po-
tentially be very useful in providing guidance on complex issues aris-
ing out of CAFTA-DR. Whether it can actually function effectively de-
pends in large part on the efficiency of the Commission. The Com-
mission is not a court with independent judges such as the European 
Court of Justice, but is comprised of political appointees. It is thus dif-
ficult to predict whether it will be able to deal with legal issues on a 
timely basis, if at all. Hopefully, the Commission will issue regulations 
that detail procedures for considering requests for advice under this 
Article 20.20, including time limits for doing so. Should, as is likely, 
the Commission be unable or unwilling to serve this function, the 
provision also gives the Party that is concerned about a particular is-
sue before another Party’s court (most likely the United States) an 
opportunity to make its own views known. 
 In CAFTA-DR, as in NAFTA, private actions against another Party 
on the grounds that a measure of another Party is inconsistent with the 
Agreement (NAFTA), or that the other Party has failed to conform to 
its obligations under the Agreement (CAFTA-DR) are barred.379 This 
reflects long-standing U.S. policy and language found in legislation that 
approves trade agreements.380 It is probably significant for the other 
CAFTA-DR nations as well. Most nations in Latin America use a pure 
“monist” system, in which treaties are fully self-executing, that is, in 
which once approved and in force, treaties automatically have direct 
applicability by government agencies, courts, and private parties, even 
where they create conflicts with existing statutes.381 In theory, since 
                                                                                                                      
379 See NAFTA, supra note 30, art. 2021; CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 20, art. 20.21. 
380 See CAFTA Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. § 4012(c) (2006) (“Effect of Agreement 
with respect to private remedies: No person other than the United States—(1) shall have 
any cause of action or defense under the Agreement or by virtue of congressional approval 
thereof; or (2) may challenge, in any action brought under any provision of law, any action 
or inaction by any department, agency, or other instrumentality of the United States, any 
State, or any political subdivision of a State, on the ground that such action or inaction is 
inconsistent with the Agreement.”). 
381 For example, in Chile, international agreements are negotiated, signed, and rati-
fied by the President. They must be approved by the Parliament, in the same manner as a 
new law. Once ratified and published in the official journal, an international trade agree-
ment is the law of the land. Since it has the same status as a domestic law, and is subse-
quent, the promulgation of the international agreement automatically repeals any prior 
inconsistent law. This was the approach used with regard both to the Marrakesh Agree-
ments and the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement. Thus, the WTO agreements were prom-
ulgated in Chile, in a simple decree which listed the Marrakesh Agreement and the sub-
sidiary international trade agreements, noted that the agreements had been approved by 
the Chilean Parliament on November 24, 1994, confirmed that Chile had deposited its 
instrument of ratification with the WTO on December 28, 1994, and stated that those 
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trade agreements are automatically the law of the land, they could be 
the basis of private citizen actions charging the government with failing 
to implement properly the agreements, unless there is some provision 
in the Agreement barring such legal actions.382 
 Finally, CAFTA-DR, like NAFTA, makes some modest effort to en-
courage alternative dispute settlement, including arbitration, among 
private citizens and entities. CAFTA-DR, in language similar to that in 
NAFTA, states: 
1. Each Party shall, to the maximum extent possible, en-
courage and facilitate the use of arbitration and other means 
of alternative dispute resolution for the settlement of inter-
national commercial disputes between private parties in the 
free trade area. 
2. To this end, each Party shall provide appropriate proce-
dures to ensure observance of agreements to arbitrate and 
for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in 
such disputes.383 
Compliance with paragraph 2 requires only that each of the Parties be 
a party to the U.N. Convention on Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, and the Inter-American Convention on International Com-
mercial Arbitration. All CAFTA-DR Parties are parties to these two 
conventions.384 
 In both agreements, there is also provision for establishing an “Ad-
visory Committee on Private Disputes,” to “report and provide recom-
mendations to the Commission on general issues referred to it by the 
Commission respecting the availability, use, and effectiveness of arbitra-
                                                                                                                      
agreement were promulgated in Chile. Decree No. 16, promulgated May 1, 1995, pub-
lished May 17, 1995 (signed by the President, Eduardo Frei, and issued by the Ministry of 
Foreign Relations). 
382 This “monist” approach also explains the U.S. practice of implementing the 
CAFTA-DR on a sequential basis, allowing it to enter into force for the United States and 
the other Parties only once the other Parties have enacted the necessary implementing 
legislation, notwithstanding the fact that under the law of the Parties the provisions of the 
Agreement are automatically applicable within their territories to private citizens, govern-
ment agencies and the courts. See generally CAFTA-DR, supra note 3. 
383 See NAFTA, supra note 30, art. 2022; CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 20, art. 20.22. 
384 See UNCITRAL, Status; 1958-Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards (2006), http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/un- 
citral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html (last visited May 5, 2007); Office of 
International Law of the Organization of America States, B-35; Inter-American 
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (1975), http://www.oas.org/ 
juridico/english/sigs/ -35.html (last visited May 5, 2007) (listing signatory countries). 
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tion and other procedures for the resolution of such disputes in the 
free trade area” and as considered appropriate, provide technical co-
operation.”385 There is, however, an important difference in the word-
ing between NAFTA and CAFTA-DR. In NAFTA, the Commission “shall 
establish” the Advisory Commission, while CAFTA-DR states that the 
Commission “may establish” it. Thus, the likelihood that there will be 
such a committee under CAFTA-DR is by no means certain. 
 The “2022 Committee” under NAFTA has been something of a 
disappointment, as its funding is very limited. (Private sector mem-
bers pay their own travel costs and per diem, and there appears to be 
funding only for the drafting of reports.) The Committee meets on an 
annual basis, and in recent years, efforts have been made to provide 
information on alternative dispute resolution through a section of the 
NAFTA Secretariat’s website.386 It is difficult to believe that a similar 
committee under CAFTA-DR, even if established, will be very active in 
the absence of significant funding, but it may be unreasonable to ex-
pect governments to support private sector arbitration beyond ensur-
ing that the necessary agreements for enforcement are in place. In 
retrospect, it is unfortunate that CAFTA-DR does not require member 
governments to enact legislation that would facilitate the use of alter-
native dispute resolution within their jurisdictions, particularly with 
regard to adopting or improving national legislation recognizing arbi-
trations held within their territories, and limiting the extent that local 
courts may review such arbitral determinations. 
Conclusion 
 The provisions of CAFTA-DR relating to investment disputes and 
those among the CAFTA-DR Parties closely follow those applicable for 
thirteen years under NAFTA, but with some significant departures. 
Among the most important innovations in Chapter 10 are changes in 
the investment protection provisions, which appear designed to limit 
the scope of “fair and equitable treatment,” customary international 
law, and indirect expropriation when applied to regulatory takings, 
along with transparency mechanisms that were added to NAFTA only 
gradually and after the fact. With regard to government-to-government 
                                                                                                                      
385 CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 20, arts. 20.22.4–5; see also NAFTA, supra note 30, art. 
2022.4 (with nearly identical language). 
386 Business Sector–Private Dispute Resolution in the NAFTA Region, http://www. 
nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.aspx?DetailID=856 (providing such information 
as a guide to private dispute resolution and model ADR clauses) (last visited May 5, 2007). 
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disputes, in addition to greater transparency of the process and the 
possibility of monetary penalties for non-compliance instead of trade 
sanctions, the major innovation relates to coverage, albeit circum-
scribed, of actions in which it is charged that a Party is failing to enforce 
its own labor or environmental laws. 
 Frequency of usage is always difficult to predict. If CAFTA-DR is 
successful in stimulating U.S. investment in the territories of the other 
six Parties, it is almost inevitable that there will be some, perhaps 
many, investor-state disputes. The first notice of intent to submit a 
claim under Chapter 10 of CAFTA-DR was filed in March 2007 by a 
U.S. firm, Railroad Development Corporation, against the Govern-
ment of Guatemala. The second is apparently to be on behalf of DR 
Energy Holdings, Inc., an electric power producer, against the Do-
minican Republic.387 Whether the Chapter 10 provisions will be used 
in investor disputes among the other six Parties is more problematic, 
although there is some indication that the use of investor-state dispute 
settlement is increasing among developing nations.388 Chapter 20— 
government-to-government disputes—likely will be used only spar-
ingly, at least at first. Many of the trade disputes arising among the 
CAFTA-DR Parties are likely to be subject to WTO jurisdiction, as in 
the conflict between Honduras and the Dominican Republic over 
cigarettes,389 even if the Parties would now have the option of choos-
ing CAFTA-DR Chapter 20.390 If NAFTA provides any basis for predic-
tions, CAFTA-DR Parties will prefer WTO dispute settlement unless 
the CAFTA-DR Parties move expeditiously to create the standing ros-
ter that will enable prompt formation of panels. One can also hope 
and expect that the U.S. government will use diplomacy and gentle 
                                                                                                                      
387 See Press Release, RDC Files Notice of Intent to Submit Claims for Arbitration Under 
CAFTA Against the Republic of Guatemala (Mar. 13, 2007), available at http:www.rrdc.com/ 
news_rdc_CAFTA_arbitration_03_13_2007.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2007); http://www.share. 
onlypunjab.com/Article/On-Behalf-of-Its-Investing-Clients--TCW-Announces-Expropriation-and 
-Other-Treaty-Claims/73911 (last visited May 11, 2007). 
388 See, e.g., ICSID, Bilateral Investment Treaties: 1959–1996, http://www.worldbank. 
org/icsid/treaties/treaties.htm (last visited May 5, 2007). As of 1996, El Salvador has BITs 
with Argentina, Ecuador and Peru, and Guatemala with Chile; all of the developing coun-
try CAFTA-DR Parties also have various BITs with developed countries. Others have un-
doubtedly been concluded in the past decade. Id. 
389   Dominican Republic–Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes,  
WT/DS302/AB/R (Apr. 25, 2005), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ 
302abr_e.doc (focusing on discrimination issues under GATT arts. 3 and 20). 
390 CAFTA-DR Article 3.2 effectively incorporates GATT Article III by reference, and 
CAFTA-DR Article 21.1 incorporates GATT Article 20. CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, ch. 3, art. 
3.2. 
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pressures in situations where the other Parties are failing to comply 
immediately and strictly with their obligations under the Agreement.391 
As with courts and other types of dispute settlement mechanisms, the 
measure of their success is not only the number of cases submitted to 
court or arbitration, but also the number of cases which were settled 
amicably because the formal mechanism existed. 
                                                                                                                      
391 With regard to China, which became a WTO Member in December 2001, the United 
States has refrained generally from resorting to formal WTO dispute resolution until very 
recently. The first request for consultations was in 2006. See China–Measures Affecting Imports 
of Auto Parts, WT/DS340, Mar. 30, 2006; see also WTO, Update of WTO Dispute Settlement Cases, 
WT/DS/OV/27 ( June 9, 2006), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/ 
WT/DS/OV27–00.doc (last visited Mar. 22, 2007). 
